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Tiivistelmä
Tutkielman tavoitteena on tarkastella luksustuotteita valmistavien yritysten liiketoiminnan
kehittymistä vuoden 2008 talouskriisin sekä sitä seuranneen taantuman aikana. Lisäksi
tutkielma pyrkii lisäämään tietoisuutta suhteellisen vähän tutkitusta luksustoimialasta.
Luksustuoteyritysten operatiivista suoriutumista arvioidaan vertaamalla näiden keskeisiä
tunnuslukuja premium­yrityksistä koostuvan verrokkiryhmän suoriutumiseen, jotta voidaan
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luokan kilpailijoitaan paremmin. Tarkastelussa liiketoiminnan kehitykseen vaikuttavista
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background and motivation 
The financial crisis of 2008 might be over but the subsequent downturn and recession in 
the world economy have shaken corporate results and consumer behaviour globally. 
While the downturn has negatively affected a large number of businesses worldwide, 
there has been a lot of discussion concerning the luxury goods industry and its reaction to 
the recession (see e.g. The Economist, 2009; Carreon, 2011; Clifford, 2011; Neate, 2013; 
Masidlover & Passariello, 2013). Some claim that the crisis had not much impact on the 
sector, while others say there was definitely a slump in the sales of luxury goods after the 
crisis, but that the impact was only short term.  In fact, the sector seems to get a high 
share of attention on a regular basis not only from the media but also from the financial 
community, business analysts, investment banks, and even consultancies despite the 
quite small size of the industry (See e.g. Bellaiche et al.2010; 2012; Belge et al., 2012, 
EIU et al., 2007). Furthermore, the sector is closely followed by the world economic 
press with emphasis on the industry and its main actors, the multi-brand groups such as 
LVMH, Richemont and PPR, or independent companies such as Hermès and Burberry. 
(Kapferer & Tabatoni, 2010, pp.4-5).  
 
While the world economy remains in a low growth mode with many people pulling back 
on spending, the sales of luxury goods, however, have not shown clear signs of faltering. 
In fact some luxury goods retailers can barely keep up with consumer demand and not 
only are many products sold out but also there are waiting lists for these items (Clifford, 
2011; Colchester, 2009). Indeed, according to Brand Finance (2012) report, instead of 
reducing their spending, consumers are shifting their consumption by turning their backs 
on traditional household favourites and lower end products and rather embrace the luxury 
lifestyle and indulgent brands despite the bleak economic outlook. Furthermore, the 
paper goes on stating that high-end fashion continued to grow during the global 
economic downturn and appears to be largely unaffected by the current economic 
climate. For instance, brands as Hermès and Christian Dior have clearly increased their 
brand value during the recession. The former, valued at $3.4 billion in 2012, grown by 
  
 
 
2 
33% since 2007 and the latter by 25%, now valued at $2.5 billion. (Brand Finance, 2008; 
2012). In addition, some luxury goods companies have shown robust sales growth on 
their quarterly reports during the recession, despite the challenging market situation and 
steeply dropped consumer confidence (Paton, 2012; Roberts, 2011).  The consulting firm 
Bain & Co reports similar findings as well. They assert in their 10th annual Worldwide 
Luxury Goods Market Study that the luxury goods sales continued to grow with an 
increase of over 10% in 2011. As a result, global luxury goods sales were expected to 
exceed !200 billion in 2012. (Bain & Co, 2011). However, when compared to other 
sectors, the luxury goods industry seems to be actually quite small. For instance, the 
giant retailer Wal-Mart (2012) with net sales around !300 billion, has more revenue than 
the estimated global sales of the whole luxury industry altogether. All this interest around 
quite a small industry manufacturing and selling products that no one really needs, might 
seem irrational. In addition, how can luxury goods companies be reporting booming 
sales, when many traditional retailers are going to the wall and unemployment is rising 
around the world affecting consumer spending across different industries (Neate, 2013; 
Dethier & Morrill, 2012; Verick & Islam, 2010). This sort of resilience seems very 
interesting and requires examination on what makes the luxury goods industry different 
from traditional retail industries. 
 
To begin with, the sales of luxury goods are driven by substantial brand power and its 
ability to evoke a dream factor. These products are bought rather by desire than need, and 
they can be characterized with a low functionality to price ratio and with a high 
intangible and situational utility to price ratio. (Königs & Schiereck, 2006; Nueno & 
Quelch, 1998, pp.61). Basically, luxury goods are items no one really needs yet millions 
desire them. These are items that serve little purpose in the lives of consumers except to 
fulfil dreams. And these dreams do not come cheap, for instance a record selling handbag 
named the “Birkin” manufactured by the French luxury goods company Hermès 
International comes with price tags starting from $10.000 and yet the waiting lists for 
these bags can stretch for years. (Wetlaufer, 2001; Roberts, 2013). One of the main 
concerns of luxury goods companies consists of the establishment and protection of an 
impeccable reputation (Königs & Schiereck, 2006, pp.3). Whereas different elements of 
business may seem to guide the brand in other sectors, the brand is the engine of a 
leading luxury goods company’s entire business model. The brand is the ultimate reason 
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why consumers choose these goods and services (Danet et al., 2008, pp.6, Okonkwo, 
2007).   
 
Secondly, due to the high-end status of the luxury goods manufacturers, the brand also 
determines the pricing power. Hence luxury goods also have ‘luxurious’ margins, some 
brands consistently yielding profit margins around 40-45%. (Kapferer & Tabatoni, 2010, 
pp.6; The Economist, 2009). Consequently, luxury brands are extremely profitable and 
the industry can be characterized with high operating margins and strong cash generation 
(Belge et al, 2012). In general, entry barriers have historically been high and demand 
relatively stable (Ganter & Freihofer, 2008). Due to this inelastic demand, some luxury 
goods companies, e.g. Hermès, can control their production and price accordingly to 
generate revenues (Roberts, 2013). In fact, luxury brands do not really compete on price 
but rather on design and desirability. During downturns, prices are generally held up as 
reducing prices to increase top line growth, the same way as traditional retailers could do, 
is out of question. By decreasing prices, the luxury goods companies would also let go of 
the “dream aspect” of the products and the glamorous image of the brand. Consumers’ 
preference for buying luxury goods decreases as price falls. Consequently, an increase in 
price may, by corollary, increase perception of exclusivity, thus making the goods even 
more preferable. (Bagwell & Bernheim, 1996; Belge et al, 2012).  In fact, many high-end 
businesses proved to be able to mark-up, rather than discount their prices during 
recession, attracting customers who equate quality with price (Clifford, 2011).  
 
Moreover, luxury goods attract customers through a combination of quality, emotion and 
rarity. However, many luxury goods companies are no longer selling rare and exclusive 
products but they are adept at pretending to do so by offering an illusion of scarcity 
through branding, pricing and distribution strategies. (Catry, 2003, pp.10). Luxury goods 
provide means to a lifestyle that is triggered by psychological and emotional needs and 
luxury brands provide a complete package of significant benefits to consumers through 
the emotional value of acquiring seemingly rare, high quality objects. Thus it could be 
quite challenging to find another sector apart from luxury goods, that can claim an 
emotional connection with their consumers to such extent that the desire for a product 
increases with the increase of the products price tag. (Okonkwo, 2007; Catry, 2003).  
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1.2 The relevance of existing research 
Previous academic attempts to provide an explanation to the controversy of luxury goods 
have failed to produce universal results. In fact, the financial performance of luxury 
goods companies seems to remain a fairly unstudied area from an accounting or finance 
point of view. Marketing literature and studies on brands and branding exist but 
examination on the operational performance of luxury goods companies is limited mostly 
to research materials often provided by research institutions or global consultancy 
companies.   
 
In addition, as a somewhat new and constantly evolving industry, luxury goods and the 
brands operating within the market have been generally studied in the context of 
healthier economies, not much during recessionary times. Furthermore, existing previous 
academic literature on luxury goods during recessions also concentrates on less dramatic 
downturns, unlike the global recession of 2008-2009, making comparison between 
different research results more difficult. This creates a clear gap in the research as to how 
these brands perform and what strategies luxury goods companies employ during 
economic downturns. Moreover, general studies on the impact of the recent global 
financial crisis on corporate profits appear to be either still in the making or the academic 
interest is concerning mainly financial institutions or broader economic consequences 
such as employment and effect on sovereigns.  
 
In addition, the luxury goods industry is continuously developing and has recently 
undergone an important evolution and several management shifts. Consolidation 
activities and private equity financing have contributed to the development of the 
industry considerably.  Furthermore, other aspects of luxury are also changing. These 
include the expansion of the luxury consumer market to include a broader mass market 
and the reinterpretation of the luxury concept by the consumer society. (Bellaiche et al, 
2010; Okonkwo, 2007). In developed countries middle-class households with growing 
incomes have begun to shop for brands that were previously seen as out of reach. The 
luxury goods industry has been tempted to meet this new demand. Furthermore, due to 
the M&A activities within the industry, many small luxury goods producers are now part 
of conglomerates such as LVMH and Richemont, which must chase sales to amortise 
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their investments and ever-growing marketing and distribution costs. Thus, luxury goods 
have become more available for the masses and a new concept of mass luxury has 
evolved. (Catry, 2003, pp.11). 
 
Finally, the geographical scope of the luxury goods market has also changed 
substantially. From its European origins, luxury goods companies have become 
increasingly global players following the emergence of new luxury markets like China, 
Russia and India. The increase in wealth and mobility of luxury consumers is also 
fuelling the sector’s expansion. (Bellaiche et al, 2010; Cohen, 2007; Okonkwo, 2007). 
Though potential customers may come from different parts of the world, their tastes are 
increasingly similar (Catry, 2003, pp.11). Consequently, the global footprint diversifies 
the market and is expected to reduce the geographical risk of change in the economic 
environment in any single market.  
 
These changes within the luxury goods sector suggest for a need for new research to 
increase the understanding of the changing luxury market and its financial performance 
as well as operational excellence. Therefore, on the above-mentioned basis, this study 
adds to the limited existing research on the industry. In addition, the current recessionary 
conditions offer a unique opportunity to study the implications of recession to the 
operational performance of luxury goods companies. Some of the companies within this 
industry may have been hit particularly hard by the downturn while others could have 
emerged not only unscratched but even strengthened. In this regard, while the crisis was 
dramatic and unfortunate, it provides an opportunity to study how financial constraints 
impact corporate behaviour in the luxury goods industry.  
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1.3 Objectives of the study 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the operational performance of luxury goods 
companies during recessionary times, including the financial crisis of 2008 and the 
following recession. Firstly, studying the performance of luxury goods companies offers 
the opportunity to analyse the evolution of their key financial performance indicators 
during the recession and comparing the performance against a benchmark group 
consisting of companies manufacturing and selling so-called premium goods. These are 
further described in Chapter 2. Secondly, in order to gain further insight on the factors 
that potentially affect the operational performance of the sample companies during the 
recession, a regression analysis is conducted to measure the effect of several variables 
suggested by the existing literature.  
 
The research questions can be specified as:  
 
1. Are luxury goods companies more resilient to economic downturns than 
companies providing premium goods? 
 
2. What company level factors explain potential difference in the operational 
performance between these groups during the downturn? 
 
 
In addition, this study aims to contribute to the existing literature by describing further 
the luxury goods market and the operating environment of luxury goods companies in 
general in addition to providing insight into the different market segments as well as the 
key operating issues that the luxury goods companies are faced with. Moreover, a large 
part of the previous academic research regarding the luxury goods industry has taken a 
marketing or management approach. Thus adding to the previous studies, this thesis 
contributes by addressing the industry from an accounting and finance viewpoint. 
Furthermore, as the existing literature on corporate operational performance during 
recessionary economic conditions remains clearly fairly limited, this thesis studies the 
impact of the adverse operating conditions to the company level performance.  
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1.4 Limitations of the study 
A major challenge in defining luxury brands is that the word “luxury” and the related 
terms are especially vague and subjective. Due to the fact that consumers perceive goods 
as being luxurious for different reasons and characteristics, their meaning depends very 
much on the user’s perspective (Kapferer, 2008, pp.96). In addition, the existing 
definitions regarding the luxury goods and the industry relate mainly to product and 
brand characteristics. Hence, there is no universally valid definition or an accurate list of 
companies operating within the luxury goods industry, which is why the sample 
companies for this research had to be hand collected. Due to the nature of the studied 
data, some limitations are inevitable as it is practically impossible to study the financials 
of all luxury brands for two main reasons. 
 
The first limitation relates to private ownership. Many important players in the luxury 
goods industry, such as Chanel SA, Versace and Giorgio Armani Spa, remain privately 
owned and hence are not required to publish financial data the same way as public 
companies. (Kapferer & Tabatoni, 2010). This aspect limits the potential study sample, 
as private companies could not be included in the study and by corollary, the data was 
gathered only from publicly listed companies. Thus, the study does not cover the whole 
universe of luxury brands but a very large population nevertheless. 
 
Secondly, many of the luxury brands, such as Louis Vuitton or Tag Heuer, operating 
within the industry, may be perceived as independent companies but are in fact owned by 
the same parent company. Indeed, the market is highly dominated by four luxury 
conglomerates: LVMH, PPR, Richemont and the Swatch Group. In their annual reports, 
the financials may be presented only at group level and information can be hidden behind 
the aggregated group level data. (Königs &Schiereck, 2006; Kapferer & Tabatoni, 2010). 
Thus the universe of luxury goods companies is limited to some extent for the purposes 
of this study.  
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An additional challenge regarding the luxury goods industry is provided by the fact that it 
covers a very large range of underlying industries and product ranges; from cars to hotel 
resorts. Due to various consumer behaviour patterns, these sectors behave quite 
differently if compared to consumer goods and may create biases when measuring the 
operational performance. Thus, for the purposes of this study, the definition of the luxury 
goods industry is limited to the so-called personal luxury goods or luxury consumer 
goods.  Hence, the data sample constitutes of companies operating mainly in apparel, 
accessories and cosmetics, which are universally similar. These can also be categorized 
as the traditional categories of luxury goods.   
 
1.5 Structure of the study 
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. After the introduction, Chapter 2 
begins with an overlook of the luxury goods industry and the operating environment, 
including the key operating issues that luxury goods companies face today as well as the 
different market segments and consumer spending patterns regarding luxury goods. 
Chapter 3 describes the theoretical framework of operational performance measurement 
during recessions and presents the hypotheses, while Chapter 4 discusses the 
methodology and data used in this study. Chapter 5 presents the empirical results and 
finally, Chapter 6 summarizes and presents conclusions. 
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2 LUXURY MARKET OVERVIEW  
2.1 Luxury goods industry 
The luxury goods industry can be considered as a collective term for companies selling - 
besides high-quality products - principally status, exclusivity and emotional benefit as 
well as the dream of separation from the ordinary (Königs & Schiereck, 2006, pp.2). 
Luxury goods correspond to the micro-economic understanding and the middle scope of 
luxury, comprising all goods exceeding what is necessary and ordinary, and are suitable 
for exchange on the market (Heine, 2012, pp.47).  This type of products and services are 
bought rather by desire than need, and luxury goods companies primarily tend to arouse 
wishes and desires among their clientele. One of their main concerns consists in the 
establishment and protection of an impeccable reputation (Königs & Schiereck, 2006, 
pp.3). True luxury means different things to different people, but for most consumers the 
term represents quality, rarity and refinement. These characteristics apply not only to the 
traditional categories of luxury, the luxury consumer goods, but also to experiences. In 
the eyes of most consumers, luxury also extends to alcohol and food, as well as to travel, 
hotels, spas, technology and cars. (Bellaiche at al, 2010, pp.1). Hence, luxury goods can 
be classified into three categories: luxury consumer goods, also called personal luxury 
goods, experiential luxury, meaning for example luxury travel and other luxury services, 
and finally luxury investment goods, such as cars, private jets and yachts. Personal luxury 
goods can further be categorized into soft luxury, such as clothing and accessories, and 
hard luxury, such as watches and jewelry. (Königs & Schiereck, 2006, pp.5; Belge et al, 
2012, Bellaiche et al, 2010).  
 
The global luxury goods sector has recently undergone an important evolution and 
several management shifts (Okonkwo, 2007, pp.3-4).  The industry was for a long time 
defined by stable environmental conditions and luxury brands were managed through 
traditional business methods where decisions were made based on intuition and 
sometimes on a trial basis. However, since the 1990’s the rapidly changing competitive 
environment has forced organizations to move towards greater flexibility (Djelic & 
Ainamo, 1999; Okonkwo, 2007, pp3). The mid 80s was a phase of several luxury 
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company formations and repositionings. In the early 1990’s market actors became aware 
of the tougher competitive situation inside the industry segment and this awareness 
marked the beginning of consolidation activities increasingly intensifying until the year 
2000 when the number of transactions climaxed. (Königs & Schiereck, 2006, pp.2).   
 
The M&A activity has been fundamentally dominated by four giant luxury 
conglomerates in Europe: LVMH, PPR, Richemont and The Swatch Group. These all 
emerged from the consolidation period of the 90’s with large, highly diversified product 
and brand portfolios as well as a strengthened market position. The French company 
LVMH, parent company to brands such as Louis Vuitton, Tag Heuer and Givenchy, is 
the largest group within the industry and has today more than 60 luxury brands in five 
different product categories: fashion and leather goods, fragrances and cosmetics, wines 
and spirits, watches and jewelry, as well as selective distribution.  PPR, owner of brands 
as Gucci, Yves Saint Laurent and Balenciaga, is more a conglomerate than a diversified 
luxury group, since it holds retail assets and a luxury portfolio including 13 luxury 
brands. Richemont, parent company to brands as Cartier and Van Cleef & Arpels, as well 
as the Swatch Group, owner of brands as Omega and Breguet, also have diversified 
portfolios, although they focus on the so-called hard luxury, as watches and jewelry. 
(Königs & Schiereck, 2006; Belge et al., 2012; LVMH, 2013; Richemont, 2013; PPR, 
2013; Swatch Group, 2013).  Some specific features of the industry imply already 
inherent merger motives: gross margins are high and operational costs partially display 
substantial differences. Hence, the exploitation of common distribution and 
manufacturing networks, economies of scale and scope as well as attempts of market 
power enhancement appear to be fundamental stimuli of these consolidation activities 
during the last two decades. (Königs & Schiereck, 2006, pp. 2).   
 
In addition, other aspects regarding the luxury market are also changing. These include 
the expansion of the luxury consumer market to include a broader mass market, 
competition from mass fashion brands, the reinterpretation of the luxury concept by the 
consumer society, the emergence of new luxury markets like China, Russia and India 
with new opportunities and outlook as well as the increase in the number of the world’s 
wealthy and changing attitudes in their spending patterns. (Okonkwo, 2007, pp.3-4).  
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2.1.1 The size and growth prospects of the market 
 
Since the 1980’s the luxury market has grown on average ten percent per year, a much 
higher rate than the world economy, making the industry a relevant economic factor 
(Heine, 2012, pp.10). In Britain consumer expenditure on luxury goods increased by 50% 
between 1994 and 2004 compared to a 7% increase for non-luxuries (Keane & 
McMillan, 2004). The sector is one of the few industrial segments that have remained a 
constant economy contributor and in addition the industry has made noteworthy 
contributions to national economies. For instance, in France the luxury fashion sector 
alone is the fourth largest revenue generator and one of the most prominent sectors in 
Italy, Spain, the USA and the emerging markets of China and India. The sector is also 
one of the highest employers in France and Italy. (Okonkwo, 2007, pp.1).  
 
Luxury is a very elastic term lacking a universal, generally valid definition (Königs & 
Schiereck, 2006, pp.5) and due to the subjectivity of the term, the estimates of the size of 
the market vary quite a lot. The traditional luxury market, consisting of the so-called 
personal luxury goods, have been estimated to range from about !150 billion to !200 
billion in 2010 (Bain & Co, 2011, pp.2; Bellaiche at al., 2010, pp.2; Klimczak et al., 
2010, pp.15). However, the global luxury market is estimated to approach !1 trillion, if 
luxury services, such as hotels and travel, and luxury cars are also taken into 
consideration when defining the industry (Bellaiche et al, 2010, pp.1). Despite the 
economic uncertainties, the consulting group Bain & Company forecasts the global 
luxury market to grow in the next few years by about five to six percent annually, and the 
Asian market by even more than ten percent (Bain & Co, 2011). The Boston Consulting 
Group estimates even higher growth rate at 7 percent annually for the global sales of 
personal luxury goods during 2012-2014, and a 12 percent growth rate for experiential 
luxury. In addition, their research has shown that the latter has grown about 50 percent 
faster than the sales traditional luxury goods (Bellaiche et al, 2012).  
 
As illustrated in Figure 1, the global traditional luxury goods market has nearly tripled in 
size since 1995. This represents an average annual growth rate (CAGR) of 7%. In 
addition, the global luxury market research company Verdict, forecasted even higher 
growth for the mid term future. Indeed, the growth expectations for the five-year period 
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from 2010 to 2015 stand at almost 65 percent, representing even higher growth than the 
already significant one experienced historically. By 2015 the global market for designer 
clothing and footwear is forecasted to generate around $11 billion of new retail business, 
of which the emerging markets will account for 30 percent. Developed markets will 
continue to dictate value performance of luxury writing and stationary as well as beauty 
and personal care, when the global market for luxury jewelry and timepieces are 
expected to outstrip the historical performance. (Bain & Co, 2011; Verdict, 2011). 
 
 
FIGURE 1 - Worldwide Traditional Luxury Goods Market trend 1995-2011 (!Bn) (Bain & Co., 2011) 
 
However, this estimate of the industry includes only personal luxury goods, which have 
been categorized as luxury traditionally. Yet the definition of the luxury market 
continues to evolve and there has been a significant area of change in the market as 
consumers are shifting in preference from owning a luxury to experiencing a luxury 
(Bellaiche et al, 2012, pp.3-4). Some luxury goods companies are also involved in other 
premium-priced categories, such as LVHM with its wines and spirits (Belge et al., 2012) 
and are also adding experience and services to current offerings (Bellaiche et al, 2012, 
pp.6). For instance, the champagne brand Moët & Chandon successfully launched its 
Mini-Moët rosé 25cl champagne bottle in the UK through an association with BMW 
around its Mini-Cooper model. The car was painted with Moët colors and featured a 
trunk fridge. This communicated the Moët & Chandon originality when driven around 
London and exhibited in the high-end department store Selfridge’s and at fashion shows.  
(Catry, 2003, pp.14). BMW was also the first high-end car manufacturer turning the 
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experience of waiting for delivery of a new car from frustrating ordeal into a fun-filled 
activity. The buyers of the Mini-Cooper-brand vehicles receive new owner updates about 
the assembly of their car and its journey from the factory. (Bellaiche et al, 2012). 
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FIGURE 2 - The estimated size of the global market for luxury goods and services (broader definition) (Bellaiche et al, 
2010) 
 
As shown in Figure 2, depending on the definition of the industry, the global market for 
luxury was actually close to !1trillion in 2010 and the personal luxury goods categories 
represent in fact only a small part of the overall market. Experiential luxury represents on 
average half of the market according to this estimate, and luxury cars on average a 
quarter. Other luxury investment goods are excluded from the estimate. It has been 
claimed that consumers want something genuine and have become more willing to pay 
for services or experiences, such as food or travel, that make them happy. This shift has a 
lot to do with demographics. For instance, consumers who drove the luxury boom in the 
1990’s have reached retirement age. They have had decades to enjoy materialistic luxury 
and will be more interested in experience-based luxury. (Bellaiche et al, 2010; Bellaiche 
et al, 2012).  
 
Due to the amorphous and constantly evolving nature of the luxury goods industry 
(Kapferer 2008, p.96), this broader categorization of the market is not expected to remain 
stable for long and this also prevents any concept of luxury from remaining valid for an 
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extended period of time. More and more new luxury product industries are emerging 
over time and there are changes in the luxuriousness of resources, which are based on 
their availability and desirability. The main drivers for these changes are technological 
progress and societal trends. The former is also the main reason for the decreasing 
relevance of the regional relativity of luxury goods. For instance, modern production 
methods have enabled the development of many products previously considered as 
luxury goods into mass-market commodities. This transformation is especially fast for 
the technical products, as has been seen in the case of mobile phones and televisions. 
However, this process can also run in the opposite direction, as is the case with some 
historically ordinary resources, such as clean air, silence and space, which have become 
increasingly rare, at least in some regions (Heine, 2012, pp.40-43).  
 
2.1.2 The global market of luxury 
 
The international market for luxury goods and services is remarkably large and seems to 
grow significantly in the future when the increasing number of affluent consumers in 
emerging markets is taken into consideration (Cohen, 2007). Luxury has always been 
closely associated with rich deposits of demand in London, New York, Paris, Milan and 
Tokyo (Bellaiche et al., 2010, pp.2), but new metropolitan areas are rapidly emerging as 
recognized centers of luxury consumption and cities such as Dubai or Shanghai are 
already known for their high-end shopping (Bellaiche et al, 2012, pp.10). Thus, fashion 
retailers have become to be part of the most international companies (Moore et al., 2010). 
Historically France has dominated the luxury goods market since the early nineteenth 
century when the first luxury brands were created, and still today the French brands 
represent on average a quarter of the global luxury market. Several of today’s largest and 
most valuable brands like Louis Vuitton, Hermès and Guerlain originated in France in 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and therefore have a long history. (Okonkwo, 
2007, pp.15). French brands have maintained their position due to the historical heritage 
and reputation of the brands. However, since the late 1990’s, the level of international 
competition has increased and the French leading position will be more and more 
challenged in the future. American, Italian and Swiss brands also enjoy considerable 
importance in the market. (Roux, 2010). The twentieth century also produced several 
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American brands such as Ralph Lauren and in addition, other respectable global luxury 
brands such as Burberry of Britain have a strong historical legacy surrounding their 
creation. These brands and their countries of origin have played a key role in the 
development of the global luxury goods industry. (Okonkwo, 2007, pp. 15).  
 
 
 
FIGURE 3 - Geographical distribution and evolution of the global luxury goods market sales (Verdict, 2011) 
 
As Figure 3 demonstrates, Europe accounts as the largest market share in global luxury 
goods sales. Although Europe together with the US still dominates the market, as has 
been the case for a long time, the Asia-Pacific region and the Middle East are expected to 
experience stronger growth in the future (Verdict, 2011). While the mature markets still 
account for the majority of sales, there has been a shift towards nontraditional markets, 
notably China (Bellaiche et al., 2010, pp.2). The emerging economies are becoming more 
and more important driver of the luxury goods industry growth also going forward due to 
the increasing purchasing power (Verdict, 2011; Bellaiche et al., 2010; Klimczak et al., 
2010). According to a Boston Consulting Group evaluation of eight major luxury goods 
companies shows a 42 percent increase in the number of stores in Asia from 2008 
through 2011, a 28 percent rise in Europe during that time, a 31 percent increase in the 
rest of the world during those years, but only a 5 percent rise in North America during 
the same period (Bellaiche et al, 2012, pp.10).  
 
  
 
 
16 
The different evolutionary stages of the luxury market in several parts of the world also 
create a challenge for luxury brand management. For instance, The European luxury 
scene is in its mature stage and consumers in this market approach luxury as a concept 
that can be adapted to their lifestyles. This contrasts with US consumers who view luxury 
as a means to a lifestyle as the US luxury market is still in its growth phase. In the 
Middle East, where luxury is in its full-bloom growth phase, consumers acquire these 
goods to make a statement of their wealth and Western know-how. Japanese consumers 
also have a similar attitude to luxury goods, albeit with a twist of affinity to specific 
French brands. In the rest of Asia, the luxury scene is in its introductory phase while in 
Africa the concept of luxury is in its early introductory phase. Hence, luxury brands face 
the challenge of finding a balance in the requirements of each of these markets through 
their products and service offerings and business strategies. (Okonkwo, 2007, pp. 3-4).  
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2.1.3 Sector drivers 
Most investors consider luxury goods demand to be directly linked to GDP growth. To a 
certain extent, that has been the case in some countries, but consumption of luxury is 
driven by social, cultural and psychological factors, as well as financial issues. The 
growth in the sales of luxury goods has been driven by emerging-market exposure, both 
within developing countries and through customers from those countries buying goods in 
Europe. Many European luxury goods manufacturers produce in Euros (France and Italy) 
or Swiss francs, and sell throughout the world. They have important exposure to the US 
dollar and dollar-linked currencies, such as the Hong Kong dollar, and to the yen. A 
weakening of the Euro or the Swiss franc has a positive impact on earnings for the 
French, Italian and Swiss luxury companies, which may have time lag depending on 
hedging strategies. (Bellaiche et al, 2010; Belge et al, 2012; Okonkwo, 2007).  
 
M&A has been a driver in the past and today the market is highly dominated by the four 
luxury conglomerates LVMH, PPR, Richemont and the Swatch Group. The targets for 
acquisitions are becoming scarce as many of the privately held companies, such as 
Chanel for example, have no pressure to sell. However, there are still deals occurring 
periodically, as the LVMH’s acquisition of Bvlgari in 2011 and the Swatch Group’s 
acquisition of the jewelry and watch brand Harry Winston in early 2013. (Königs & 
Schiereck, 2006; Belge et al, 2012; Swatch Group, 2013). 
 
The driving force behind the exponential growth of the luxury industry since the 1990’s 
was the so-called democratization of luxury, in which goods formerly reserved to a 
restricted elite are now consumed by a large public even if only occasionally (Dubois et 
al, 2001). However, this concept of giving everyone access to luxury branded goods is a 
paradox because it abandons the exclusivity that formed the original basis of the luxury 
industry in the hands of skilled designers and craftsmen (Degen, 2009). The consumers 
of luxury goods are increasing in numbers, and the age group has become younger and 
younger (Jian, 2009). Due to the increasing number of target customers of luxury goods, 
more and more people are willing to spend more also from an emotional perspective. In 
other words, the luxury goods industry is indeed of great potential that cannot be ignored.  
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2.2 Defining luxury  
The major challenge for the definition of luxury goods or brands is that the word 
“luxury” and the related terms are especially vague and subjective, as consumers 
perceive goods as luxurious for different reasons and characteristics, their meaning 
depends very much on the user’s perspective (Kapferer, 2008, pp.96; Heine 2012, pp.16). 
The concepts of luxury differ as they depend on each person’s social position and 
personal consumption experiences, it is a relative term that could refer to almost anything 
or nothing depending on whom you ask (Csaba, 2008). This makes it difficult to give 
luxury goods a universal, globally valid definition.   
Historically the word luxury, derived from the Latin word Luxus meaning indulgence of 
senses regardless of cost, has been defined as anything that extends beyond the bare 
necessities, it is more than a person needs. Nueno and Quelch (1998) stated that a luxury 
product is a work of art designed for an exclusive market. Kemp (1998) thought the 
concept of luxury goods would change because of different social and economic 
backgrounds. Dubois and Duquesne (1993) used ambiguous phrases to define luxury 
goods as “the dream value”, while Aaker and Keller (1990) proposed the reason that, 
consumers buy luxury goods more for what they mean than for what they are. 
 According to Kapferer and Bastien (2009), today many producers want their product to 
be luxury and the word has become an inflationary used and worn out label for almost 
anything. Many mass consumption brands name their products “deluxe” or qualify the 
experience of consuming these as luxurious. On the contrary, most luxury brands refrain 
form explicitly declaring their products as luxury, while at the same time actually selling 
more and more non-luxury products (Heine, 2012, pp.9). In addition, there are an 
increasing number of non-luxury brands selling luxury products or so called masstige, or 
mass luxury, products with at least some feeling of luxury (Silverstein & Fiske, 2005, 
pp.50; Heine, 2012, pp.9). As a result, defining what constitutes a luxury product or 
service today has become somewhat of a challenge (Vigneron & Johnson, 1999).  
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2.2.1 The relationship between luxury products and brands 
 
The branding aspect is an integral part of a luxury goods company’s definition. The 
brand is the reason why consumers associate themselves with a luxury company. It is 
what creates and sustains the attraction and desire for these products. (Okonkwo, 2007, 
pp.4). Thus, by definition, luxury brands need to offer luxury products and without a 
product portfolio that includes luxury goods, it is impossible to achieve a luxury brand 
image (Heine, 2012, pp.61). Conversely, the product range of a luxury brand does not 
necessarily consist only of luxury products (Kapferer & Bastien, 2009, pp-312). 
Accordingly, all products of a luxury brand can be referred to as luxury-branded products 
(Heine, 2012, pp. 61). Luxury brands are highly associated with their core products, as 
for instance Louis Vuitton with travel goods and accessories and Hermès with leather 
goods and silk scarves. (Kapferer, 2008, pp.193) Consequently, as luxury brands are 
obviously characterized by selling luxury products, they are usually defined by product 
related characteristics. 
 
According to Okonkwo (2007) a true luxury brand exhibits 10 core characteristics as 
indicated below: 
1. Innovative, creative, unique and appealing products 
2. Consistent delivery of premium quality 
3. Exclusivity in goods production 
4. Tightly controlled distribution 
5. A heritage of craftsmanship 
6. A distinct brand identity 
7. A global reputation 
8. Emotional appeal 
9. Premium pricing 
10. High visibility 
 
Luxury products on the other hand can be identified by their features or by their 
consequences, such as purchasing motives and consumer values. However, the 
description of their consequences is not enough to distinguish luxury goods from non-
luxury products, the characteristics-based approach has become widely accepted in the 
literature (Heine, 2012, pp.27). 
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One of the features all luxury goods have in common is a high price, which comes in an 
inter-categorical comparison excluding the so-called affordable indulgences. Luxury 
products belong to the most expensive category when compared to similar products. This 
requires a considerable price premium to products with comparable functional 
characteristics. (Heine, 2012, pp.73). The production of luxury goods has traditionally 
been limited in order to obtain high price and exclusivity. However, defining luxury 
goods in terms of price raises some questions since highly priced products are not 
necessarily considered as luxury goods (Dubois & Czellar, 2002; Prendergast et al., 
2000). Luxury brands, like Louis Vuitton or Hermès, have a heightened status and due to 
this high profile these kinds of companies can charge premium prices in comparison to 
products or services with similar functions (Moore and Birtwistle, 2005, pp.258, Ward & 
Chiari, 2008). These goods are bought rather through desire than need, it can be said that 
they are in effect two-thirds brand and one-third product or two-thirds emotion and one-
third function. Further, Luxury goods are said to have a low functional utility to price 
ratio while their ratio of intangible and situational utility to price is high (Nueno & 
Quelch, 1998, Königs & Schiereck, 2006). 
 
Another very important characteristic for luxury goods is high quality, meaning an 
inherent, unique know-how, which may concern either a specific feature or the overall 
quality and performance of the good (Dubois and Czellar, 2002). Premium quality must 
be obtained in all product lines from the most to the least expensive items (Nueno & 
Quelch, 1998). Superior quality may relate to the manufacturing characteristics or 
product attributes. Manufacturing characteristics can relate to the expertise of the 
manufacturer as well as technical or stylistic competences. (Heine, 2012, pp.74). In the 
luxury goods industry craftsmanship is more valued and appreciated than mass 
production. Many luxury brands have a heritage of craftsmanship centuries stemming 
from the original designer and it can be said that these brands are driven on tradition and 
their brand heritage. (Nueno & Quelch, 1998). The manufacturing of a luxury product 
also requires considerable effort, often including handcraft and a substantial amount of 
time. The materials used in the production of luxury goods can also be considered as a 
key characteristics and most important criteria when evaluating the value of a luxury 
good (Heine, 2012, pp. 74-5).  
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Furthermore, luxury products are by definition not ordinary, but rather a rarity. Luxury 
companies ensure rarity through limiting production and the individualization of their 
products. (Heine, 2012, pp.60-61).  Initially, rarity stemmed from the limited availability 
of raw materials, components or production capacity. For instance, in the wine and spirit 
business customers recognize that products may be in limited supply due to the lack or 
excess of rain or sunshine. The luxury industry has always been familiar with natural 
shortages and capitalizing on these to express rarity may lead to a durable competitive 
advantage if the company can secure its supplies. However, there are some drawbacks 
regarding this fact. Firstly, natural scarcity is a clear impediment to the sales ambitions 
stimulated by the emergence of increasing number of potential customers. For instance, it 
is difficult to find enough diamonds at an appropriate price to satisfy demand while 
maintaining quality levels. In addition, if quality fails, it may jeopardize the brand image. 
Thus, a luxury product component must always be perceived are rare by the market, even 
though they may actually be such only seemingly. Furthermore, human expertise may 
also be perceived as scarce, although this constraint could be to some extent eased 
through training. Hence, the traditional emphasis on the hand-made aspect of luxury 
goods. Thus, if not self evident or well perceived, the level of availability of natural 
luxury components should clearly be part of any marketing policy. (Catry, 2003, pp. 11-
12).  
 
 Finally, the aesthetic products design is also one of the most important strategies for 
luxury goods companies in order to differentiate themselves from mass-market 
manufacturers. Luxury goods also generate numerous non-functional, abstract 
associations and hence, it has been said that there exists no other product category with a 
similar relevance of symbolic benefits, which often even exceeds its functional benefits. 
The symbolism of luxury products and brands is covered to a large extent by the concept 
of brand personality. The five major dimensions of the luxury brand personality include 
modernity, prestige, sensuality, understatement and eccentricity. Luxury goods 
companies can convey the symbolic meaning of the brand through product design or with 
specific product information. (Heine, 2012, pp. 77-80). Luxury brands often have a 
global reputation and are strongly associated to a country of origin that has a strong 
reputation as a source of excellence in the relevant product category (Nueno & Quelch, 
1998; Heine, 2012, Okonkwo, 2007).  
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Dubois, Laurent and Czellar (2001) provide an interesting summary of the features 
luxury goods usually have in common and should posses in order to be classified as 
luxury products: 
 
• Consistent delivery of premium quality 
• Perceived exceptional nature of the materials used in the elaboration process 
• Perceived delicacy and expertise involved in manufacturing products or delivering services 
• Considerable craftsmanship, every detail  important. Often inherited from original designer 
EXCELLENT 
QUALITY  
• Perception established by absolute value of price or 
• by comparison with non-luxury alternatives VERY HIGH PRICE 
• The uncommon skills essential to the manufacturing and delivery process 
• Limited nature of the offering, availability and usage 
• True luxury products cannot be mass-produced and are restricted in distribution 
• Element of uniqueness to each product 
SCARCITY AND 
UNIQUENESS 
• Luxury products as pieces of art 
• Aesthetic dimension not only expected from the goods themselves but also from the context 
in which they are presented as well as from the people who consume these goods 
• Luxury goods not only look beautiful but should be pleasant to hear, smell, taste or touch 
AESTHETICS AND 
POLYSENSUALITY 
• Long history and their elaboration processes as well as consumption respecting tradition 
• Luxury goods need to have a story/legend to tell 
• Personality and values of its creator 
• Association with a country of origin with a strong reputation 
ANCESTRAL 
HERITAGE AND 
PERSONAL HISTORY 
• Luxury products are not felt to be necessary for survival 
• In order to be regarded as luxurious, products or services must not derive their value from 
functional characteristics but from additional benefits of a different nature 
SUPERFLUOUSNESS 
 
FIGURE 4 - The definition of luxury goods by Dubois, Laurent and Czellar (2001) 
!
Moreover, luxury goods attract customers through a combination of quality, emotion and 
rarity. However, there is a trade-off between rarity and volume. When rarity is based on 
the supply and production sides of the product value chain such as the rare components 
and materials, this trade-off is influenced by physical constraints and sales are naturally 
limited. More virtual rarity drivers, such as company marketing and distribution policies 
or the information transmitted to customers, are less of a sales impediment, as they do 
not imply a physical product shortage. They help to push the trade-off curve towards 
more volume while not sacrificing the differentiation aspect of luxury goods. Thus, given 
the volume temptations stimulated by the emergence of new demand and the sales 
requirements of luxury conglomerates, a clear tendency towards more virtual exclusivity 
drivers can be perceived. The product is not objectively limited in supply, but luxury 
goods companies give their customers an illusion of rarity through the information they 
deliver. (Catry, 2003, pp. 15-17).  
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2.2.2 Distinguishing luxury product and brands from similar concepts 
 
Vigneron and Johnson (1999) use prestige as a benchmark to measure the component of 
luxury in a brand. Prestige can be defined as a sign of status and material success and 
normally something that impresses people (Catalani & Comboni, 2002). Vigneron and 
Johnson (1999) assert that the prestige inherent in a brand consists of five elements: 
perceived conspicuous value, perceived unique value, perceived social value, perceived 
hedonic value and perceived quality value. Two types of brands are categorized as 
prestigious, firstly upmarket brands, also referred to as premium brands, and secondly 
luxury brands. In short, a luxury brand is perceived to be the extreme end of the prestige-
brand category (Phau & Prendergast, 2000). Luxury brands can further be categorized 
into two types, masstige and prestige brands. The former can also be referred to as new 
luxury and the latter as old luxury.   
 
Nueno and Quelch (1998) have also identified three types of brands in the luxury goods 
category. Firstly, limited awareness brands, often managed by family businesses and 
focused on the delivery of a narrow product line to an exclusive niche market. These are 
also known as old luxury goods or prestige brands as above. These products are often 
handcrafted and available only through selected specialty stores. The second type is well-
known brands that are inaccessible to a broad market as a result of premium price and 
the fact that they cannot be sampled. These can also be referred to as masstige brands as 
above. Lastly, the third type is well-known brands in categories that permit affordable 
accessory items to be available to a broader audience. This type represents premium 
brands. 
 
Figure 5 demonstrates the differences concerning the product and brand characteristics 
between different types of luxury brands and premium brands compared to the so-called 
medium-level brands meaning brands outside the premium and luxury goods group. 
(Heine, 2012, pp. 67).  
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FIGURE 5 - Different types of luxury brands vs. medium level brands (Heine, 2012). 
!
2.2.2.1 Premium goods and brands  
 
Luxury products and brands can be distinguished from the premium segment by their 
constitutive product and brand characteristics as presented in the previous section of this 
Chapter. The differentiation between luxury and premium brands is mainly a matter of 
degree, which makes it difficult to draw a clear line, especially between top premium 
brands and entry-level luxury brands. However, there is an essential difference between 
these two types of brands as premium brands focus especially on functional 
characteristics while luxury brands put much more effort into creating symbolic meaning. 
(Heine, 2012, pp. 66). 
 
As demonstrated in Figure 5, premium brands rate higher on the product and brand 
characteristic dimension than medium-level brands, but still well below luxury brands. 
While premium brands still remain down to earth and cannot lose sight of the value-for-
money ratio, luxury brands are reaching exceedingly reasonable levels in the major 
luxury dimensions. (Heine, 2012, pp.66).  
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2.2.2.2 Different types of luxury 
 
Silverstein and Fiske (2005) have distinguished the concepts of new luxury from old 
luxury. According to the authors, new luxury describes a class of goods that have very 
distinct characteristics, when old luxury is about exclusivity. New luxury goods are far 
more accessible than old luxury goods, but their accessibility is more limited than 
conventional middle-market products. The new luxury concept can be further divided 
into three types. Accessible superpremium products are priced at or near the top end of 
the category, and at a considerable premium to conventional offerings. However, they are 
still affordable for the middle-market consumer as they are relatively low priced. Old 
luxury brand extensions are lower-priced versions of products created by companies 
whose brands have traditionally been affordable only for the rich households earning 
$200.000 and above. The third type, masstige goods are neither at the top of their 
category in price nor related to other iterations of the brand. They occupy an area in the 
market between the other types of luxury while commanding a premium over 
conventional products, but priced well below superpremium or old luxury goods. 
(Silverstein & Fiske, 2005, pp. 4-5). The term masstige conveys their main idea: offering 
prestige to the masses (Heine, 2012, pp.67-68). 
 
However, there is a problem considering new luxury. The challenge for new luxury 
manufacturers is to determine an optimal unit volume. If the goods become too available, 
they lose their sense of being limited in nature, and they will be unable to command a 
premium price. Old luxury goods are priced to ensure that only the top-earning 1 to 2 
percent of consumers can afford them and to provide a large enough margin so their 
makers can be profitable at very low unit volumes. New luxury goods are always priced 
at a premium to conventional middle-market products- often as a tenfold premium-but 
are still priced within the financial reach of 40 percent of American households and not 
out of the question for 60 percent of them. (Silverstein & Fiske, 2005, pp. 55-56). Brands 
often follow opposing trajectories: mass market brands repeatedly attempt to gain 
prestige, differentiation and margins by “trading up” (Almadoss & Jain, 2008; Goldman, 
1975), while luxury brands marketers frequently endeavor to grow by broadening their 
offering portfolios, or “trading down”, sometimes with dire consequences (Reddy & 
Terblanche, 2005).   
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2.2.3 Utility generated by scarcity 
 
Luxury goods companies provide a complete package of significant benefits to 
consumers, the social environment and the global economy. Luxury brands are also 
among the most valuable and influential brands in the world. When people purchase 
luxury goods, they don’t just buy the product but a complete parcel that comprises the 
product and a set of intangible benefits that appeal to the emotional, social and 
psychological levels of their being. In fact, it might be quite challenging to find another 
sector, that can claim an emotional connection with their consumers to such an extent 
that the desire for a product increases along with the increase of the price tag. (Okonkwo, 
2007, pp.2-3).  
 
Luxury brands have traditionally adopted the premium pricing strategy to emphasize the 
brand strength, high quality and exclusivity associated with luxury goods, and also to 
differentiate them from the mass-market brands. The luxury target audience is less price-
sensitive and actually expects luxury goods to be premium-priced rather than 
economically priced. Pricing forms a part of the branding process as consumers often 
judge the position of a brand and the value of a product in terms of price. (Okonkwo, 
2007, pp.140).  Utility theory in microeconomics formulates that a customer will make 
judgment on a goods utility and compare it to the utility of money, namely the price of 
this good and if the latter one is bigger than the former one, the customer will feel it is a 
good deal and make the purchase decision. (Du, 2009, pp.23). An intriguing phenomenon 
is that when a luxury good is available in several different brands, people tend to prefer 
the most expensive one, even if they understand that the quality differences among these 
are too small to match their substantial price difference. Because of this kind of eccentric 
consumer behaviour, many counterfeit producers have become millionaires by selling 
fake products at extremely high prices. (Yao & Li, 2005, pp.529).  
 
Petrova and Pruzhansky (2011) have proposed a model describing consumer demand for 
a luxury good, in which the perceived quality of the good is related to its exclusivity that 
in return depends on the number of consumers buying it. They have used the model to 
analyse the optimal production and price setting decisions of a luxury goods 
manufacturer and contrast them with decisions that would be made by a social planner. 
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They show that irrespective of the way social welfare is defined, a monopoly producer of 
the luxury good may select socially optimal prices and quantity. Thus the incentives of 
the monopolist producer and the social planner may to some extent be aligned. In the 
study, decision making of a representative consumer is considered for just one luxury 
good, the existence of ‘ordinary’ goods is disregarded. In addition, it is assumed that the 
luxury good is produced by a monopolist.  
 
       
B
A
 
 
 FIGURE 6 - Changes in utility following a reduction (increase) in price (quantity) (Petrova & 
Pruzhansky, 2011) 
 
This model is based on the scarcity and exclusivity components of the luxury good, and 
is justified by the statements of some key luxury goods manufacturers who believe that 
the chief value of a luxury good lies in that it is not too common, and that the widespread 
sales may destroy the high end image of the products, which mainly determines the 
consumers’ utility and willingness to pay. In this model the consumer utility, or more 
specifically the perceived quality, of a luxury good negatively depends on the number of 
consumers who buy it, i.e. its exclusivity or scarcity. The more common the good, the 
less is its perceived value. This specification leads to the negative network externality 
effect, whereby an increase in consumption by new customers reduces the utility of those 
who already consume the good. (Petrova & Pruzhansky, 2011) 
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2.3 Luxury goods spending patterns  
2.3.1 The Veblen effects and conspicuous consumption 
 
The economic literature on luxury goods originates from the work of Thorstein Veblen in 
the nineteenth century (Veblen, 1899/2008). In economic theory, luxury goods are 
generally defined as goods for which the demand increases more than proportionally as 
income rises, contrary to necessity goods. This is also known as the Veblen effect or the 
prestige effect (Klimczak et al, 2010). Veblen coined the term conspicuous consumption 
to refer to people’s desire to provide prominent visible evidence of their ability to afford 
luxury goods (Solomon, 1999, pp.427). Conspicuous consumption plays a significant 
part in shaping preferences for many products that are purchased or consumed in public 
contexts. Consuming luxury goods is a form of conspicuous consumption and makes an 
excellent example of Veblen goods (Phau & Prendergast, 2000). Micro-economic 
consumer theory suggests that conspicuous consumption patterns can be identified at the 
individual consumer level in terms of conformism and snobbism.  Conformism behavior 
occurs when consumer demand for the product increases just because other people are 
also purchasing it. Snobbish behavior is exactly the opposite: an individual tends to buy 
less of the product if other people are buying the same. These two types of conspicuous 
consumer behavior correspond to the desire not to be identified with the poor and to be 
identified with the rich.  (Dubois et al, 2001, pp.5).  
 
Conspicuous consumption was in full swing in the late 1990’s and the early 2000’s. 
Many consumers thought of luxury goods largely in superficial terms, brand image 
sometimes mattered more than quality (Bellaiche et al, 2010, pp.1).  It is said that luxury 
goods have high-income elasticity of demand, as people become wealthier they tend to 
buy more and more luxury goods (Ward & Chiari, 2008; Ward & Secondi, 2005, pp.7-8). 
In addition, luxury goods have an at least partially upward-sloping demand curve and 
may possess no real intrinsic utility (Dubois et al, 2001, pp.5). Consumers’ preference for 
buying luxury goods decreases as price falls and consequently an increase in price may 
increase perception of exclusivity and thus make the good even more preferable (Bagwell 
& Bernheim, 1996; Okonkwo, 2007).  
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People who buy luxury goods do not want to pay less if they seek to signal high levels of 
wealth. If companies would decrease the prices of luxury goods, demand for those 
products would decrease, as they would no longer be considered as exclusive or high 
status products. Decreasing their prices would damage the products and brands 
glamorous image, which is why true prestige brands don’t sell their products on sale. The 
gains would first rise, but after a while sales would drop substantially as the brand would 
lose its value. (Bagwell & Bernheim, 1996, pp.349-352; Okonkwo, 2007, pp.140). In 
fact, luxury brands do not really compete on price but rather on design and desirability. 
During the downturn, prices are generally held up. In recovery phases, brands tend to 
launch higher-priced, higher-margin products, and raise prices again. (Belge et al, 2012).  
Thus, unlike other companies, luxury brands cannot improve their sales in a recession by 
decreasing prices.   
 
2.3.2 Changing world of luxury 
 
In the past it was considered that only wealthy people could own luxury goods and many 
producers of luxury products believed that their clientele came from upper income 
classes and thus the managerial practices of luxury goods companies were based on this 
assumption (Dubois & Duquesne, 1993). The demand was driven by wealthy consumers 
for whom luxury was an irreplaceable source of self-indulgence and distinction. 
(Bellaiche et al, 2010, pp.1). However, the luxury goods industry has undergone a 
considerable development during the two elapsed decades and two major factors have 
changed the industry considerably: the democratization of luxury and changes in tastes 
and buying behaviors. Due to the so-called democratization of luxury, luxury goods have 
become accessible for a broader mass market worldwide. It is no longer the case that 
only the wealthy can afford certain luxury products, as the number of aspiring consumers 
has boomed (Okonkwo, 2007, pp.3-4; Bellaiche et al, 2010, pp.1-5).  Luxury goods 
companies aim product categories at a much larger market, the middle class. New luxury 
products are perceived as high quality and stylish, without being overly expensive and 
hence making them more accessible. New luxury consumers are willing to spend an 
amount of money disproportionate to their income for products they consider highly 
important. For instance, some people consider a daily !4 coffee from their local coffee 
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shop as luxury, others like to spend on expensive home renovations, high-end cars or 
expensive dinners. (Silverstein & Fiske, 2005).  
 
Indeed, as of today, on average half of total luxury sales have been estimated to come 
from regular consumers with average to well-paying jobs. Furthermore, when studied for 
buyer behavior, the six mature and developing markets (EU, US, China, Japan, Russia 
and Brazil) that together account for 90% of global luxury spending in 2010, show 
interesting findings. Based on their wealth and how much they spend on luxury items 
annually, the 150 million households in the region can be segmented into 5 segments as 
shown in Figure 7 below. (Bellaiche et al, 2010, pp.4-7) 
 
• Annual income of at least !55 000 in developed markets and !18 000 in emerging markets.  
• The consumers in this segment tend to have average jobs and backgrounds, but they aspire to an above-
average lifestyle. They are not big spenders with an average of !400 per household on luxury goods each 
year, but as a group they are significant.  
• 30 percent of traditional global luxury sales- or about !45 to !50 billion 
ASPIRATIONAL 
MASS-MARKET  
• Annual income of at least !110 000 in developed markets an !35 000 in emerging markets.  
• Consumers in this segment come from a middle-class background but have well-paying jobs 
• The segment accounts for about one-fourth of global luxury sales – or !35 to !40 billion 
RISING MIDDLE-
CLASS 
• This segment consists of high-net-worth households, which have at least !725 000 in bankable assets. They 
earned the wealth themselves, through both investment and business activities.  
• Spent the most on luxury goods, about !55 to !60 billion, or more than one-third, of traditional luxury sales.  
NEW-MONEY 
• Also high-net-worth households but unlike new-money consumers, they inherited rather than generated their 
wealth. The youngest are at least second-generation millionaires. Some are related to aristocracy, others 
derive their affluence from family-owned businesses.  
• This group accounts for roughly !10 billion, or about 7 percent, of traditional luxury sales.  
OLD-MONEY 
• Similar to old-money households, but they have complete indifference to status. Whereas old-money 
consumers are likely to purchase luxury goods not only because of their value but also because the brands 
match their lifestyle, beyond-money consumers avoid ostentatious displays of wealth. Their disdain for 
conspicuous brands is in a way an affirmation of their elite status.  
• This group accounts for about 5 percent of traditional luxury sales.  
BEYOND MONEY 
 
FIGURE 7 - Luxury spending consumer segments (Bellaiche et al, 2010)  
 
As presented in figure 8, spending and preferences on different categories of luxury 
goods vary between consumer segments. Aspirational consumers spend about 60 percent 
of their luxury budget on cosmetics and fragrances. Among other consumer segments, 
this category accounts for between 10 and 30 percent of luxury spending. Their second 
largest category is leather goods and accessories, where they spend 20 percent of their 
luxury budget on.  Beyond money consumers on the other hand spend 35 percent of their 
luxury budget on watches and jewelry and 35 percent on furniture and decorations, while 
the first two consumer segments only spend a maximum of 15 percent of their total 
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luxury budget on these types of goods. Fashion and clothing is a sizeable category for 
rising middle-class, new-money and old-money consumers as it accounts for 30 percent 
of their luxury spending. Hence, it can be concluded that regular consumers prefer soft 
luxury, and the high-net-worth consumers have a preference in hard luxury.  
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FIGURE 8 - Luxury spending across consumer segments (Bellaiche et al, 2010) 
 
The spending habits of the three least established segments, the aspirational mass-market, 
the rising middle-class and the new-money households, have undergone a profound 
change. Until recently, consumers in these segments viewed luxury items as status 
symbols. Today however, many of these consumers especially in mature markets have 
began to question why they buy luxury goods, and choose rather products that have true 
value. This trend has been less evident among old-money and beyond money consumers, 
as they have never felt the urge to telegraph their status. They tend to buy luxury goods 
because of their intrinsic value and may even view these as investments. They prefer 
authentic brands, ones enriched by a combination of heritage and quality, and they 
generally buy products on the basis of their personal interests. (Bellaiche et al, 2010, 
pp.5).  
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This new demand that luxury goods companies face from the middle-class and emerging 
markets has become increasingly relevant for luxury goods companies management. 
While the new demand brings new opportunities, all companies within the luxury sector 
face the question whether exclusivity, so central to the luxury appeal, is inevitably 
diluted by the increased market share, thus balancing growth with exclusivity is clearly 
one of the biggest challenges for luxury goods companies today. (Catry, 2003, pp.11; 
EIU et al., 2007, pp. 16). This new demand and the pressure to meet it, makes luxury 
goods companies confronted with a dilemma. They can either ignore it, by pursuing their 
traditional differentiation strategy and risk being isolated in an elitist niche market, or 
they can launch new, more accessible lines that embrace the potential sales volumes but 
also can potentially endanger their exclusive image. (Catry, 2003, pp. 11).   
 
Indeed, many luxury brands have diluted their exclusivity by bringing out new and more 
accessible lines to drive profits. The wealthy have responded to this by demanding ever-
increasing levels of exclusivity from the brands they buy. This desire for exclusivity is 
especially important for very wealthy consumers, with 35% demanding it from their 
luxury purchases compared to just 18% for mass affluent consumers. (EIU et al., 2007). 
A growing fatigue with mass luxury products means that consumers are looking for 
products that provide them with lasting value, the return they will get from the 
experience of owning or wearing, fewer, better things. This shift from conspicuous 
consumption to more discerning consumption will be even more in evidence as economic 
conditions worsen and brand value comes under greater scrutiny. (Silverstein & Fiske, 
2005). 
 
In fact, today the competitors of luxury brands come more and more from the mid-range 
and premium fashion categories. Where historically the luxury goods companies 
competed mainly with each other, today the consumers have learned a tendency to 
combine luxury goods with low-end retail and thus no longer purchase only luxury 
goods. Moreover, the consumers have changed over time and have become more critical 
and the luxury goods companies have learned that to please today’s consumers they need 
to contribute more. This holds particularly well for the products at the high end of the 
price range as the consumers paying a higher price have also higher expectations that are 
harder to meet. (Roux, 2010).  
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2.4 Luxury brands in times of economic downturn 
As a somewhat new and constantly evolving industry, luxury goods and the brands 
operating within the market have been generally studied in the context of healthier 
economies, which creates a gap in the knowledge as to how these brands perform and 
what strategies luxury brand managers employ in times of economic downturn. 
Academic studies regarding the impact of the recent global financial crisis on luxury 
goods companies appear to be either still in the making or the academic interest is 
concerning mainly financial institutions or broader economic consequences.  
 
Some of the previous research starts by suggesting that the sales of luxury goods should 
be more sensitive to economic fluctuations, especially recessions. The logic behind this 
thinking assumes that rich households, who have traditionally been considered as the 
main consumers of luxury goods, hold most equity, which loses in value during 
recessions and thus decreases available incomes for the wealthy households. Hence, 
according to this research line, the consumption of luxury goods covaries significantly 
more with stock returns than basic consumption. (Aït-Sahalia et al., 2004). Bils and 
Klenow (1998) found that luxuries and durables are more susceptible to business cycles 
than necessities and nondurables. Accordingly spending on non-essential items declines 
during economic recession and one would expect that luxury brands would therefore be 
significantly affected in such economic conditions (Reyneke, 2011). Although, 
continuous research has shown that consumer buying of the mass luxury is not much 
affected by economic conditions and that the performance of companies providing these 
goods remains strong even in a downturn (Silverstein and Fiske, 2005). An important 
question therefore rises if different types of luxury offerings are differentially affected. 
 
One report that follows the thought of rich households losing available income during 
recession is the 2009 World Wealth Report, compiled by Capgemini and Merrill Lynch 
who focused especially on individuals classified as high- or ultra-high net worth 
individuals (HNWIs or Ultra-HNWIs). The report stated that by the end of 2008, the 
world’s population of HNWIs was down 14.9%, and that their wealth value had declined 
19.5% over the previous year. Ultra-HNWI’s had been affected even more: their numbers 
had shrunk by 24.6%, and their wealth had declined by 23.9%. Similarly, Forbes (2010) 
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list of the world's billionaires reported that the number of billionaires in the world had 
fallen from 1,125 to 793. Thus, it would be fair to assume that wealthy consumers have 
also been affected significantly by the current recession. Whether this has had an effect 
on their spending on luxury goods and services is less certain. 
 
However, on the contrary, other commentators have argued that luxury goods companies 
have often had the ability to maintain a position for their brands at the top end of their 
particular markets for decades, and have successfully fended of the effects of wars, 
scandals and even economic recession (Koehn, 2000; Brook, 2001). Luxury brands have 
also said to be remarkably resilient (Bevelander, 2004). Some brands have shown that 
even after years of mismanagement or misguidance, a quick and successful recovery can 
be made (Reyneke, 2011). Thus, this may be an indication that luxury brands operate 
within a unique market niche (Twitchell, 2002; Stanley, 1988). The luxury goods 
industry is exceptional as it relies strictly on marketing and promotion to sell products to 
a specified group of people. In order to keep their marketing strategies unique the 
companies disclose very little information, other than regulated, on their businesses. As a 
result, a countless repertoire of marketing strategies, though targeted to a select few 
afford to buy luxury goods, the vast majority of people who are exposed to 
advertisements for these products in general have aspirations of being able to own these 
products in the future. (Nguyen, 2004). Furthermore, while at first the links that these 
statistics imply might seem obvious, in reality there is no substantiation to suggest that 
all luxury brands have been adversely affected by economic cycles. (Reyneke, 2011). 
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3 CORPORATE PERFORMANCE DURING ECONOMIC CRISES 
 
Economic crises tend to have a significant impact on corporate performance, both when 
measured in share price as well as accounting data. Surprisingly however, in general, the 
existing academic literature on firm level performance during financial crises or 
economic recessions is quite limited (see e.g. Latham & Braun, 2011, pp. 111).  
 
While economic crises tend to be fruitful subjects for academics the subject is discussed 
more regarding a broader economic context such as implications to employment, gross 
national product etc. In addition, given that the recent crisis was initiated by the global 
financial turmoil the subject has created notable amount of interest towards the effect it 
has had on financial institutions. In this light, luxury goods industry is not an outlier. 
While several headlines have claimed that luxury seems to defy the economic crises, 
academic literature on luxury goods industry performance during downturns is limited to 
a handful of studies. 
 
Indeed, from accounting’s and business management’s point of view, the literature seems 
to be still in the making or focused on certain academic interest points e.g. to managerial 
reactions to survive during harsh economic conditions. In addition, a topic that seems to 
be more studied is the reactions of small and family owned companies while strategic 
accounting and planning has also been studied to some extent. Unfortunately, firm level 
operating performance has seemingly not been the most discussed subject in view of the 
existing literature for this thesis. It is however interesting to extend the points raised in 
these papers to see whether similarities can be found within the luxury goods industry. 
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Although the existing literature is not extensive yet the elements of the firm level 
performance measurement can be specified as illustrated in the following figure: 
•  Traditional measures of growth 
•  Revenue and earnings growth 
•  Employment growth 
GROWTH 
•  ROS/ROA 
•  EBITDA 
•  Working capital management 
OPERATING 
PERFORMANCE 
•  Gearing 
•  Financial flexibility 
RISK AND 
LEVERAGE 
 
FIGURE 9 - Components of firm level performance during crises 
 
In the light of previous literature, the firm level performance during a crisis can be split 
in three parts. Firstly, growth is a fairly traditional and easy indicator of performance. 
This can be measured e.g. by the change in revenues and earnings but also as the change 
in the staff indicating employment growth. Secondly, for the measurement of the 
operating performance previous studies suggest several financial ratios including return 
on sales, return on assets, earnings before interest, amortizations and depreciations as 
well as working capital management. Finally, the third suggested component consists of 
risk and leverage. An interesting topic in this category is the role of financial flexibility 
before and during economic downturns, which has received attention from the 
academics. 
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3.1 Growth 
Growth during recessions and economic crises is most often measured as the percentage 
change in top line revenues or the impact on firm’s employment. In this regard, the 
following table presents recent academic literature concentrating on growth and growth 
initiatives during economic slowdowns: 
 
Author / Year of 
study
Country / 
Period
Sample Findings
Kapferer & Tabatoni 
(2010)
Global / 
2008-2009
10          
(Largest 
Luxury Co's)
The top global luxury brands continue to grow 
and operate profitably with "luxurious" gross 
margins but no defining specificity in terms of 
operational performance can be identified.
Varum & Rocha 
(2011)
Portugal / 
1988-2007
> 100.000 By examining the link between foreign 
ownership and firm employment and turnover 
growth during economic downturns the authors 
find no differences in employment growth but 
results suggest that foreign ownership may 
affect positively to sales growth during a 
recession. 
Fukao (2001) ASEAN/ 
1997-1999
1.101 While overall FDIs and exports from the South-
East Asian countries dropped significantly 
during the late 90's currency crisis, Japanese 
subsidiaries operating in the area were able to 
grow sales by 17 percent and retained 
employment.
Filipetti & Archibugi 
(2011)
Europe / 
2009
5.238 European companies react differently to 
innovation during economic slowdowns. In 
order to boost sales in a recession, Northern 
European companies have created stronger 
innovative capacity and emerge relatively 
stronger after the crisis. 
MacFarland et al. 
(2010)
US / 2007-
2009
109 Growth of small companies is dependent of 
local policies and to some extent of the size of 
the business. Micro-size companies grow faster 
during the studied period that SMEs. 
 
TABLE 1 – Previous research on business growth during recessions and economic crises 
 
 
The most obvious measure of growth is the effect on revenues. In hindsight it is easy to 
argue that most companies face pressure in demand for their products during a crisis, 
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which is reflected in decreasing revenues. Consequently, when companies are growing 
they tend to increase employment, which can be seen as another measure of growth. 
Overall revenue growth depends however on the operating environment so that within 
each sector, whether during a crisis or not, some companies may find market niches that 
continue to grow. Other companies may have invested significantly in innovation and 
thus have a growing offering due to product advantages. On the other hand, market 
leaders may be subject to declining revenues due to their relative market size, which is 
harder to defend. Finally, top line growth can be found from other geographical markets 
that can compensate for loss in home markets. (Kitching et al., 2009; Filippetti & 
Archibugi, 2011; Varum & Rocha, 2011) 
 
One market niche is the subject of this study, luxury goods. According to Kapferer & 
Tabatoni (2010) the sector reported solid sales growth figures going to the recession in 
2008 and once the US stopped to buy luxury items in 2009 the sector continued to post 
healthy growth despite the global recession as sales in Asia continued to boom. As many 
recent reports and earning guidance of luxury goods companies show, the growth has 
been continuing at double-digit rates since 2009. In fact as the annual reports for 2011 
are being released, they are confirming that 2011 has been again a stellar year for leading 
luxury labels (Paton, 2012). Driven by the increased sales the companies have also 
grown when measured with employment, thus suggesting that a global niche strategy 
diversifies growth opportunities and enables profitable growth despite the economic 
cycle.  
 
Varum and Rocha (2011) add to the debate on the role of multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) in face of a crisis and the respective impact in host economies. Prior studies 
have been related mostly to Asian financial crisis in late 1990’s (see e.g. Fukao, 2001) so 
the authors use the recent financial crisis to measure effects in Europe, namely in 
Portugal. After controlling for firms’ and industries’ characteristics and foreign 
ownerships the results do not suggest any significant difference in employment growth at 
the host nation compared to local enterprises. This suggests that growth would be an 
outcome of firm and industry characteristics rather than ownership features. 
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Fukao (2001) reports somewhat different findings from Japanese subsidiaries operating 
in the South-East Asian countries during the financial crises that they faced late 90’s. 
According to Fukao, the Japanese subsidiaries kept the same levels or increased the 
number of employees despite the radical drop in exports during the crisis. Different to 
Varum and Rocha (2011), Fukao argues that the reason may lie in the manufacturing 
nature of these subsidiaries, i.e. that the sales are headed from the headquarters and are 
thus not directly linked to host country performance during the crisis. In addition, during 
that time many subsidiaries were somewhat recent investments so the role of sunk costs 
regarding the establishment of manufacturing units, which may have played a role in the 
management’s decisions not to reduce employment. 
 
 Varum and Rocha (2011) report of a clear downturn effect on revenues during a 
downturn but the effect has been found to be significantly different regarding the firms’ 
age, and size. Larger firms tend to have better sales’ performance and turnover growth 
seems to lower during firms’ infancy, growing faster only after firms attain a minimum 
age. Finally, while the authors acknowledge that there is a significant downturn effect on 
the firms’ turnover growth rate for all companies, the foreign companies seem to fare 
better. Indeed, foreign firms post some 5 percent higher growth rates during recessions 
than their domestic competitors. This effect also seems to be more significant for SMEs 
than large companies during recessionary times. In terms of revenue growth, Fukao 
(2001) reports similar findings to Varum and Rocha (2011). The studied Japanese 
subsidiaries increased sales on aggregate by 17 percent despite the drop in FDIs and 
overall exports. This suggests that they were benefiting from their foreign ownership and 
that they could rely on support from their owner where as the local enterprises were 
struggling without financial backing during the difficult period. 
 
In an attempt to boost sales growth during recessionary times companies may turn to 
innovations as a source of additional revenues. Filippetti and Acrchibugi (2011) studied 
how European companies reacted to the downturn in terms of innovation and research 
and development costs. Their findings are in line with initial expectations that innovation 
expenditures tend to decrease during difficult times but the change is surprisingly low. In 
fact over half of the sample retained the level of innovation expenditures although only 
some ten percent increased the expenditures from pre-crisis levels. Filippetti and 
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Archibugi (2011) also argued that geographies that remained relatively less affected are 
those with higher innovation expenditures. This holds particularly well for e.g. countries 
like Germany, Sweden, Austria, Switzerland and Finland which all have indeed come out 
of the crisis stronger than their Southern-European counterparts. This suggests that 
during crises one possible mean to react to declining revenues is to ensure that innovation 
remains important within organizations. 
 
Finally, MacFarland et al. (2010) studied the growth of small businesses’ during the 
crisis and in respect of local policies. For their sample the authors report of a relatively 
high mean growth rate of about 11 percent. The figure can be further split into self-
employed and very small companies, which experienced even higher growth while SMEs 
with 30-99 employees faced slightly declining growth during the studies period. The 
authors further argue that the difference in the growth rates is dependent on different 
local policies towards small businesses as well as other controlling factors such as 
population growth and density. Interestingly however, the smaller companies seem to 
find growing niches or underserved sectors despite of the recession. 
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3.2 Operating Performance 
Most academic literature measuring operating performance use simple ratios such as 
return on sales (ROS), return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE), although the 
latter is admittedly more a measure of financial data (Hart and Ahuja, 1996).  According 
to Fairfield and Yohn (2001), ROA measures the firm’s ability to generate revenues from 
its assets while return on sales or profit margin measures the firm’s ability to control the 
costs incurred to generate revenues. Thus the level of asset turnover reflects the firm’s 
asset utilization and the profit margin reflects operating efficiency. The authors argue 
that both measures are products of the firms’ strategies as for instance luxury or specialty 
stores tend to have lower asset turnovers and higher operating margins than e.g. discount 
retailers. 
 
However, other operating performance measures are proposed e.g. by Long (1998) by 
applying eleven different ratios from the income statement and balance sheet data. 
Firstly, three profitability related variables are defined as operating income per sales, 
income tax per sales and net income per sales. The rationale for using operational income 
relies in the fact that it does not take into account depreciations, which may vary greatly 
between different firms. Net income on the other hand omits extraordinary expenses.  
Another point suggested by Long (1998), which fits well also in the case of luxury goods 
companies, is the potential effect of goodwill in total assets. This holds particularly with 
luxury goods companies, as they have historically been very acquisitive in their growth 
strategies. Thus as the purchase prices for other companies include generally large 
premiums above the target’s book value of assets by using sales instead of assets in the 
denominator provides an alternative approach. This has its flipside though as return on 
sales is not comparable over industries but as in this study the companies operate within 
the same industry the critic on return on sales is not relevant.  
 
Depending on the subject of the study, some academics have also argued to measure 
operating performance by earnings before interests, amortizations and depreciations 
(EBITDA) and its variations (EBITDA/Sales or EBITDA-margins). This is due to 
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EBITDA’s role as a quite accurate measure of cash flows in cases where the real cash 
flows are not measurable or available (see e.g. Guo et al., 2011; Wilson et al., 2012). 
 
The following table presents the most relevant literature for the purposes of this study: 
Author / Year of 
study
Country / 
Period
Sample Findings
Wilson & Eilertsen 
(2010)
US / 2007-
2009 190
Most of the sample companies implemented 
reactions to the crisis, the ones with higher 
level of strategic planning and accounting were 
better prepared and fared the crisis better. 
Wilson et al. (2012) UK / 1995-
2009
15.000 Revenue growth and profitability is positive for 
private equity backed companies during 
recessionary times. In addition, the 
performance is better than with non-private 
equity backed companies. 
Lopez et al. (2011) Spain / 2008-
2009
796 Over 67% of the sample companies studied had 
very high impact on EBIT level. Consequently, 
the impact on the EBT level was perceived as 
higher. 
Kane (1997) US / 1968-
1990
NYSE Accounting ratios were found to contain 
conditional information on performance during 
a recession. The association was found to be 
stronger in recessions than during expansion. 
Marques et al. (2011) Portugal / 
1993-2005
1357 Downsizing during recessionary times does not 
improve long term operational performance 
when measured with ROA or profit margins. 
 
TABLE 2 – Previous research on firm performance during recession and economic crises 
 
For one thing, all studies above conclude that the economic downturn has clear effects on 
the top line revenues due to reduced consumer and corporate spending. The effect on 
profitability however is depending on several aspects, including e.g. ownerships, 
company size and financial slack going to the crisis, managerial efficiency and level of 
strategic accounting. In addition, growth initiatives and niche market positions may have 
a protecting effect during crises as described in the previous sub chapter. 
 
Wilson and Eilertsen (2010) performed a survey study on how strategic planning affected 
the company performance during the economic crisis of 2007-2009. The authors 
surveyed 190 practitioners about how planning practices have served in the respective 
organizations during the 18 months from the start of the crisis in 2007. The survey 
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revealed that the sample reacted very differently as 49% of the companies took defensive 
actions while 51% actually continued to invest in growth. The different reactions affected 
profitability differently, but in general the decline in profitability ratios were not as steep 
as in revenues suggesting that the reactions taken improved profitability relative to sales. 
Although strategic accounting was important also in terms of financial results the 
variable relationship was not statistically significant. The main contribution of strategic 
accounting was noted in the companies’ abilities to respond proactively either in 
defensive or growth oriented manner to maintain or enhance operational profitability 
despite of the economic environment (Wilson & Eilertsen, 2011). 
 
Wilson et al. (2012) studied the operating performance of private equity backed 
companies during recessionary times. Analyzing a large sample of companies over 
several recessionary cycles and comparing against both public and private non-private 
equity backed companies the authors find significant differences in terms of profitability 
during crises. In terms of operating efficiency and profitability the private equity 
acquired companies showed clearly better working capital management during the 
studied period, suggesting that the active owners were able to create further flexibility 
than their public peers. In addition, profitability of these companies – both when 
measured with ROA and profit margins – remained clearly higher than the peer groups’ 
during the studied period. The authors suggest that this is due to a selection bias as the 
financial investors target usually more solid companies in the first place but also due the 
owners’ ability to increase efficiency and add to the operational performance during their 
ownerships (Wilson et al., 2012).  
 
Finally when measuring the earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation of tangible 
assets and amortizations of intangible assets (EBITDA) per sales, or EBITDA-margin 
one should be able to compare profitability and operating efficiency. Wilson et al. argue 
that for the private equity backed companies the owners actions are also reflected in the 
EBITDA level which on aggregate remain more positive than the peer group. For 
performance measurement, the benefit of using EBITDA is that it is unaffected by 
depreciation and amortization policies which may differ significantly in each company. 
Moreover, EBITDA-margin is also a measure of operating income i.e. it is not affected 
by the capital structure of the companies. Thus if one company generates less net profits 
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but has high leveraging the EBITDA-margin might actually be higher than its peer 
generating higher net profits. (Barber & Lyon, 1996; Guo et al. 2011). 
 
Lopez et al. (2011) studied the performance of several hundred SMEs during the worst 
stages of the financial crisis during 2008-2009. The authors report of a significant decline 
in profitability as a result of a sharp decrease in top line revenues. The main negative 
consequence of worsening profit margins is recorded on gross operating profit and 
EBITDA. Consequently the authors noted that as a counter measure to the negative 
impact of falling demand, the companies typically increase asset turnover as a result of 
decrease of the overall investment in the businesses. However, this reaction has not been 
sufficient to offset the falling demand on the turnover and the final effect on return on 
assets has been negative over the studied period. Furthermore, Lopez et al. (2011) argue 
that the fall in profitability is also higher in terms of return on equity as prior to the crisis 
a large proportion of the sample had levered their balance sheets. Thus despite the 
gradual reductions in the interest rates going through the crisis the increase in financial 
costs explains part of the decline in ROE. 
 
Regardless of the company type, falling profitability most often triggers retrenchment 
strategies.  These strategies aim to downsize the operations in search for enhanced 
productivity and efficiency in response to organizational decline.  As such the 
relationship between downsizing and future financial performance is linked so that 
downsizing can be used as a rational and to some extent predictable tool for manipulating 
operational performance. According to the existing academic literature, this is done by 
diminishing personnel cost which is most often enhanced by reducing the number of staff 
on the company’s payroll. Thus, the increased operational performance emerges from 
lowered cost of running operations or by achieving competitive advantages due to the 
consequent reduction of pricing (McKinley et al., 2000; Cascio et al., 1997). 
 
Marques et al. (2011) argue that the effects of the downsizing are not bearing fruits as 
expected as they do not find evidence of improved performance after downsizing by 
using measures of ROA and profit margins. On the contrary, the authors argue that 
downsizing is most often used as a reactive tool and as such the companies launching 
broad downsizing campaigns are probably poorly run in the first place.  Furthermore, 
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Marques et al. (2011) suggest that while in a distressed turnaround situation downsizing 
might be the only way out as a reaction to suddenly changed operating environment it 
may not be the best solution unless the environment has changed permanently. Their 
findings suggest that during a steep crisis such as the recent one downsizing does not add 
to the companies’ long-term profitability rates. 
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3.3 Financial flexibility, leverage and risk during crises 
Risks associated to the operational performance during a crisis can be viewed from the 
market perspective as described before, e.g. the weight of one single market or a single 
client. As this is a company specific feature a more generic approach can be found in the 
use of leverage or how the business is financed. In this regard the following table 
presents relevant existing literature for this thesis regarding financial flexibility and 
leverage during recessions: 
 
Author / Year of 
study
Country / 
Period
Sample Findings
Bancel & Mittoo 
(2011)
France / 
2008-2009 34
The authors measured the impact of the global 
financial crisis depending on the financial 
flexibility of underlying companies. As 
expected the companies with more flexibility 
fared the downturn better. 
Ang & Smedema 
(2011)
US / 1980-
2008
>35.000 By analyzing how firms manage their financial 
flexibility conditional on the expected 
probability of a recession the authors find that 
in the aggregate firms do not appear to prepare 
for downturns. This is due to company 
characteristics, cash rich firms prepare while 
constrained ones cannot do so. 
Marchica & Mura 
(2010)
UK / 1965-
2008
4.290 The authors demonstrate that financial 
flexibility is higher amongst the companies that 
show lower overall leverage. Consequently, this 
sample increased its capex and r&d spending 
after a period of lower leverage. Finally, the 
companies with higher financial flexibility 
outperformed the market for a longer period of 
time. 
Wilson et al. (2012) UK/ 1995-
2009
15.000 Despite the historically high levels of leverage 
applied in private equity backed buyout 
transactions, the underlying companies 
remained on average more profitable than their 
public counterparts and thus were able to add to 
their financial flexibility. Furthermore, private 
equity backed companies invested more than 
their peers during the downturn. 
 
TABLE 3 – Previous research on financial flexibility and leverage during recessions 
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From the existing literature, a clear interest can be found towards the financial flexibility 
and corporate liquidity. Financial flexibility refers to the ability of a firm to respond 
timely and in a value-maximizing manner to unexpected changes in the firm’s cash flows 
or in the investment opportunity set. While the concept of financial flexibility is not new 
it has not seen a first-order determinant of financial policies. Until recently, most 
corporate finance textbooks have emphasized the perfect capital market case presented 
by Miller and Modigliani (1958) where firms always invest at the first-best level. The 
perfect capital market case however assumes a frictionless environment which recessions 
and crises most definitively do not make part (Denis, 2011). 
 
Hence, the concept of financial flexibility becomes interesting in the presence of such 
financing frictions. With financing frictions there can be some states of the world in 
which firms are constrained from undertaking valuable projects. Furthermore, in the 
presence of financial frictions it can be valuable for firms to choose financial policies that 
preserve the flexibility to respond to unexpected periods of insufficient resources by 
emphasizing the role of cash and other liquid assets in the balance sheets. (Denis, 2011). 
In their paper, Ang and Smedema (2011) analyze how firms manage their financial 
flexibility going into recessions or downturns. The authors use ex-ante measures of 
future recessions and find that in the aggregate the firms seem not to prepare to difficult 
times ahead. Further to Denis (2011) the authors argue that the importance of financial 
flexibility during recessionary times is that active monitoring of cash position and a 
flexible structure prevents the firms to run short of cash, which is a particular risk in a 
recession. 
 
Ang and Smedema (2011) choose the variables measuring financial flexibility mainly by 
scaling the cash and cash equivalents to create meaningful comparisons over a lengthy 
sample period of several decades. Furthermore, the authors measure the impact of non-
cash sources by constructing an alternative measure, available funds, i.e. levels of unused 
debt capacities. The target financial flexibility is then controlled by size, growth proxies 
and current cash flow volatility before including leverage measured as total debt scaled 
by net assets. Going to recessions the value of financial flexibility should increase which 
is why the authors expect firms to prepare by accumulating flexibility before economic 
frictions. According to the models presented in the paper it seems that while the 
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probability of a friction increases in aggregate the firms do not prepare but also they 
appear to decrease flexibility as the prospect of a recession increases. Digging deeper to 
the statistics however, the authors note that some 60 percent of the sample is to some 
extent financially constraint when measured by cash-to-net-assets. Thus by splitting the 
sample to constrained and unconstrained firms, the authors note that once the probability 
of a recession increases the unconstrained firms have a positive correlation to their net 
cash position. For the constrained ones the relation is negative. (Ang & Smedema, 2011). 
 
Bancel and Mittoo (2011) introduce a more qualitative approach to measure financial 
flexibility. Their paper aims to gain insights into how managers perceive and achieve 
financial flexibility and its value in coping with the global financial crisis. This is done 
by a questionnaire survey and interviews with the sample company chief financial 
officers (CFOs). According to the authors, more than two thirds of the studied managers 
report a strong or very strong effect of the financial crisis and identify banks’ reluctance 
to lend as a major problem during the crisis adding to the constrained financing. While 
the interviewed managers agree that low leverage is beneficial during the crisis they also 
use several other sources to enhance financial flexibility. These include e.g. internal 
funding, high cash holdings and availability of banking lines and credit. Finally, the 
authors find that firms with greater internal funding during the crisis, low short term debt 
and high cash ratios have lower impact from the crisis although each of these firms 
caption some effect from the global financial crisis. (Bancel & Mittoo, 2011).  
 
Marchica and Mura (2010) study the interaction between financial flexibility and firms’ 
investment ability. While maintaining the arguments based on Modigliani and Miller 
(1958) they argue that through conservative leverage policy companies maintain a degree 
of financial flexibility that allows them to have better access to external market when 
faced with positive shocks to their investment set. This is in line with e.g. Bancel and 
Mittoo (2011) where the CFOs report financial flexibility amongst the most important 
factors in their decision-making. Furthermore, financially flexible companies that report 
a period of spare debt capacity, i.e. reasonably leveraged companies are able to invest 
significantly more than financially constrained companies.  Marchica and Mura (2010) 
report of an average increase of 37 percent in financially flexible firms. This result 
provides rationale for many firms’ apparent conservative leverage behavior. 
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Additionally, the authors argue that the firms’ ex-ante optimum debt level reflects the 
value of the option using debt capacity to borrow in tighter times and move away from 
target debt levels to meet imperfectly anticipated funding needs. 
 
While Marchica and Mura argue that low ex-ante debt levels provide protection against 
downturns, Wilson et al. (2012) provide an opposite example from leveraged buyouts. 
By definition, leveraged buyouts are corporate acquisitions that are most often financed 
with external debt financing. Thus the balance sheet structures are often more aggressive 
than in what financial flexibility theories would suggest as optimal. At the early stages of 
the recession, some commentators had fairly pessimistic views of private equity backed 
companies outlooks. They argued that such companies would be highly vulnerable given 
their high multiples and historically high levels of leverage. Against this, private equity 
backed companies were able to invest more than their public peers and managed to repay 
debt giving further flexibility during the crisis. (Wilson et al, 2012). In this regard, it 
seems that both low and high leverage structures may be financially flexible despite 
recessionary times.  
 
Based on the literature discussed above, it is clear that leverage should be included for 
the purposes of this study as well. In previous academic literature, two ratios point out as 
the most common ones to measure leverage. Firstly, by measuring the net debt divided 
by total assets has been somewhat typical ratio in previous academic studies (see e.g. 
Axelsson et al. 2012) as it provides a picture how the company is financed. In other 
words, how much of the company’s balance sheet is financed with equity and what is the 
proportion of external financing. Although external financing is more inexpensive for the 
company, it is also riskier as described above. Secondly, an other useful ratio is to 
measure the leverage against earnings before interests, taxes, depreciations and 
appreciations (EBITDA), often referred to as debt coverage ratio. This measure provides 
information on the company’s ability to generate cash flows to serve debt.   
 
Finally, in addition to the risk of financial constraints and high leverage, Kapferer and 
Tabatoni (2010) discuss the luxury industry in a classic textbook example of risk, market 
beta. Given that beta measures the systematic part of the risk, i.e. how sensitive the stock 
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in question is in relation to overall market, the timeframe of 2008-2009 provides an 
interesting setting to see how luxury industry has fared in comparison to overall market.  
 
Kapferer and Tabatoni (2010) find that in line with earlier studies the luxury sector is 
characterized by a relatively low market risk. Although global luxury market is not 
immune to overall market shocks they do not experience as fierce drops as other sectors 
of retail. The authors continue that although luxury goods companies tend to have betas 
less than one (e.g. Richemont 0.7 or Hermès 0.9), they still have higher betas than the 
most-known discount retailers such as Wal-Mart, indicating that luxury industry is not 
the most low-risk sector. While beta measures a company’s systematic risk, what is 
interesting is the risk that is dependent on any given company due to its properties.  
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3.4 Hypotheses 
Based on the literature review discussed in the previous sub chapters, the following 
hypotheses can be applied. The purpose of this study is to examine the operational 
performance of luxury goods companies during the financial crisis of 2008 and the 
subsequent recession. In addition, by comparing the performance of luxury goods 
companies to a benchmark group consisting of premium goods companies, the study 
aims to analyze whether the performance of luxury goods companies differs from the one 
of their premium peers. Furthermore, in order to gain more insight on the factors that 
potentially affect the performance of the two groups during the recession, the effects of 
several variables that potentially could have an effect on the results are measured as 
presented in the hypotheses. 
 
 H1: The luxury goods companies are not immune to an economic downturn 
 
The first hypothesis is based on the literature presented in this chapter, according to 
which growth during the downturn is a function of several aspects. While some luxury 
goods companies have grown despite the economic downturn, the overall industry 
consists of different companies with different size, strategies and core markets and thus, 
it is expected that the downturn has its effects on the industry as a whole. 
 
H2: The impact of recession is greater on premium goods companies than on 
luxury goods companies 
 
The second hypothesis is derived from the discussion presented in Chapter 2, where the 
premium goods companies are argued to have a product offering covering needs that are 
above the consumers’ basic needs. Consequently, during downturns their demand should 
decrease as spending is reduced from unnecessary products. However true prestige or 
luxury brands are seen to benefit from their superior brand power and increasingly global 
wealthy clientele thus it has been argued that the demand for the luxury goods 
companies’ products would not be affected as much by economic downturns. 
 
H3: The luxury goods companies show increased operational performance despite 
the recession 
 
As the luxury goods companies have higher operating margins than their premium 
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counterparts, they are expected to continue doing so despite the economic environment 
because alongside higher profitability they have more flexibility to choose among growth 
options. Furthermore, as the luxury goods companies operate globally, they are expected 
to be able to leverage the diversification brought by several markets and thus even out 
the negative effects. 
 
H4: If the luxury goods companies show increased operational performance, sales 
growth contributes positively to the performance 
 
The fourth hypothesis relies on Kapferer’s (2010) findings that some luxury goods 
companies have recorded high sales growth rates during the crisis. Thus, if the operating 
performance has increased at the same time, it is expected to be positively associated 
with the sales growth suggesting that the high margins are not solely due to better 
management skills but also due to attractive products.  
 
H5: If H3 holds, financial flexibility is contributing positively to operational 
performance 
 
As discussed in this chapter, financial flexibility remains very important during tough 
economic times. If most of the cash flows are used to serve financial liabilities the 
company is left with limited resources to invest in growth opportunities or to take other 
measures to improve efficiency as a counter measure to the recession. In addition, the 
initial financial position going to the crisis dictates to some extent the companies’ 
abilities to cope with worsened economic conditions. 
 
H6: Larger companies have more room for maneuver during the recession and are 
thus less impacted by the downturn 
 
As argued by Marques et al. (2011) and MacFarland et al. (2010) company size is also a 
factor in a company’s performance during the recession. While the smaller companies 
may be more agile in finding new growing niches and adjusting their strategies 
accordingly, during a downturn larger companies are expected to be better positioned to 
keep higher operating performance due to their ability to cut costs from a larger cost 
base. In contrast, smaller companies often have a larger proportion of costs that are 
necessary to run the business and thus making it harder to adjust rapidly to worsened 
conditions. 
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4 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Description of the data 
The data used for this study consists of twenty publicly traded global luxury goods 
companies and a peer group consisting of twenty premium goods companies also 
operating globally. The timeframe selected for this study begins in 2007, which is 
considered as the starting point for the global financial crisis. This is also the year when 
the U.S housing market started to show early signs of cracking and consequently led to a 
full-blown economic crisis. The end point of the timeframe is 2010 as this is when the 
underlying economies came out of the crisis, technically measured as two consecutive 
quarters of GDP growth. (OECD, 2012).  
 
Thus, the sample data includes the financial statements of the 40 companies during this 
period and accordingly, the time frame of this study covers the whole global economic 
crisis of 2007-2009.  The sample companies are carefully selected in order to monitor for 
the possible changes in the luxury goods industry during the crisis as well as for the peer 
group. In addition, by having the peer group included in the sample allows for measuring 
for differences between the luxury and premium goods companies. The databases used to 
gather data for the sample are Thomson One and Bloomberg while the financial reports 
are collected from the companies’ respective websites. Both commercial databases also 
allow for comparing the financial statements by providing additional information on 
financial performance of the selected sample companies. 
 
For the purposes of this study, the luxury goods industry is limited to the so-called 
personal luxury goods or luxury consumer goods.  The selection criteria and data 
elimination process shall be further described in the following sub-chapter.  
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4.2 Sample Selection 
4.2.1  Study Period 
In most of the previous studies on firm performance during recessionary times the 
samples are selected ex-post to include recessions and economic crises defined simply as 
a decline in the regions’ GDP growth rates over two subsequent quarters. Ang and 
Smedema (2011) provide several other perceptions of recession but as these are ex-ante 
measures to forecast recession they are not relevant for the purposes of this study. It is 
worth to note that the definition of the event window is dependent on the purpose of the 
study and availability of data. As the purpose of this study is to measure the performance 
of luxury companies during the crisis, the pre-crisis levels should be controlled in the 
event window. Secondly, as the studied companies are publicly traded their quarterly 
reports are also publicly available conveniently matching the quarterly measures for the 
operating environment or GDP growth in this study. 
 
 
FIGURE 10 - Real Global GDP change 2007-2011 (OECD, 2012) 
 
In hindsight it has been well documented that the global economy entered a period of 
slow to negative growth in the late 2008. In the OECD countries, the decline in aggregate 
growth rates started already in mid-2007 and continued until the second quarter of 2009. 
Furthermore, OECD Composite Leading Indicators signals also that the economy started 
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cooling down during the second half of 2007. The above is further illustrated in the 
Figure 10 showing the aggregate indicators for global economy. (OECD, 2012). 
 
The period 2007-2010 was thus chosen as the main period of study for it covers all three 
parts of the economic cycle: slowdown, recession and rebound. Although one could 
argue that 2007 was still a record breaking year in terms of corporate revenues, it should 
have been affected by the slowing markets during the second half of the year and thus 
qualifies in the sample. Furthermore, 2010 is included to have a confirmation of non-
recessionary full year performance where as 2009 included two quarters of recession and 
thus would not qualify. 
4.2.2 Luxury goods companies group and selection criteria 
 
As discussed already in the limitations part of Chapter 1 and in Chapter 2, the luxury 
goods industry covers a very large range of underlying industries and product ranges 
depending on the definition of the industry. For the purposes of this study, the definition 
of the luxury goods industry is limited to the so-called personal luxury goods or luxury 
consumer goods.  In addition, for the purposes of this thesis, the luxury brands are 
defined as presented by Okonkwo (2007). All the companies selected to the luxury goods 
group must possess the following ten characteristics: 
 
1. Innovative, creative, unique and appealing products 
2. Consistent delivery of premium quality 
3. Exclusivity in goods production 
4. Tightly controlled distribution 
5. Heritage of craftsmanship 
6. High visibility 
7. Distinct brand identity 
8. Global reputation 
9. Emotional appeal 
10.  Premium pricing 
 
  
 
 
56 
Due to the lack of a universally valid definition of the luxury goods industry and its 
constantly evolving nature, there is no accurate list of companies operating within this 
industry. Hence, the companies for this research had to be hand collected. As presented 
in Chapter 2, existing definitions regarding the luxury goods industry relate mainly to 
product and brand characteristics. Some rankings concerning luxury brands exist, for 
instance, Interbrand has a luxury sector in their 100 most valuable brands ranking (See 
e.g. Appendix 4 & 5), but these rankings cannot be used as such due to the fact that many 
luxury brands remain privately held and due to the conglomeration activities reining the 
industry, many luxury brands presented on the rankings are in fact owned by same 
companies.  
 
The S&P Global Luxury Index provides an interesting starting point for the sample 
selection process as the index consists of 80 of the world’s largest publicly traded 
companies engaged in the production or distribution of luxury goods, or the provision of 
luxury goods services that meet specific investment requirements. (S&P, 2012). 
However, while the index components are easily available, it needs to be treated in order 
to verify the comparability amongst the sample. The index constituents cannot be used 
for this study per se due to the fact that the determination of the luxury status of the 
luxury goods companies is subjective and the determination of the companies qualified 
for the S&P index differs from the definition of luxury goods industry used in this thesis. 
The universe from which the S&P Global Luxury Index constituents are drawn consists 
of industries ranging from Casinos & Gaming to Specialty stores. As mentioned, the 
index also includes companies that are engaged only in the production or distribution of 
luxury goods and hence, cannot be classified as luxury goods companies only on those 
terms.  
 
Hence, the first limitation is that companies that do not share the industry classifications 
and operate mainly in other sectors than luxury consumer goods are eliminated from the 
sample. Companies operating mainly in other sectors than apparel, accessories or 
cosmetics are excluded for the purposes of comparability. Other sectors include several 
industries that are subject to different industry dynamics (e.g. automobiles, yachts, 
publishing or gastronomy) and could thus create outliers in the sample and consequently 
bias the results.  
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Furthermore, from the economic point of view the companies selected to the sample need 
to have a global reputation in order to have global sales reach. However, despite the 
global reach their association with the country of origin is also noted in this study. Thus 
the financial data of companies that belong to the S&P Global Luxury Index is adjusted 
by eliminating the constituents that do not operate globally. For example, companies that 
operate only in Asia are eliminated as they might represent an outlier in the otherwise 
global data due to higher relative growth in Asia compared to the rest of the world. 
Finally, all companies must also be public since 2007 or have their financial results 
public starting from full year 2007.  
 
As the definition of Luxury goods used for the S&P Luxury Index seems to be quite wide 
and basically companies are identified to the index only based on the level of 
involvement with luxury goods and services (S&P, 2012), the universe of the index 
constituents also includes companies that can be considered as premium goods 
companies.  As discussed in Chapter 2, the differentiation between luxury and premium 
brands is mainly a matter of degree, which makes it difficult to draw a clear line, 
especially between top premium brands and entry-level luxury brands. Thus, the index 
constituents are further adjusted by the definition of luxury brands provided by Okonkwo 
(2007). The S&P Luxury goods index data and eliminations made for this study can be 
found in Appendix 4, I and II. In addition, the sample is further adjusted so that it 
contains the companies owning the most valuable brands ranked by Interbrand and The 
World Luxury Association (see Appendix 4-5). 
 
As a result after the adjustments the final sample of the luxury goods companies consists 
of 20 globally operating publicly traded luxury goods companies. Due to the 
conglomeration activities within the industry, the sample represents a total of 223 luxury 
brands. The final list of the companies used in the sample is presented in Appendix 1, I, 
II and III. The sample characteristics are presented further in Figure 11. 
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FIGURE 11 - Sample distribution by geography and main product line (Luxury goods group) 
 
The figures above illustrate the distribution of the selected luxury goods companies 
sample by geography and by the main product lines. In terms of geography, the 
companies are sorted by the location of their global headquarters and the main stock 
exchange. The sample is relatively evenly split between US and the largest European 
luxury producing countries. Thus, as expected France and Italy account for 50 percent of 
the sample while the US counts for 25%. The lack of Asian companies is explained by 
the fact that as of today, no Asian (or Hong Kong listed) luxury companies have 
established position in the European or US markets. 
 
In terms of main product line, it should be noted that the judgment is highly subjective in 
some sectors as most of the sample companies have very complimentary product ranges. 
Perhaps the clearest call is between jewels and watches and cosmetics. These two 
categories account for some 40 percent of the sample, optics for five while the remaining 
55 percent comes from clothing and accessories. 
 
After having obtained the initial sample of luxury goods companies, the relevant data is 
collected from Thomson One Banker and the companies’ financial statements.  
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4.2.3 Peer group and selection criteria 
 
As the purpose of this thesis is to measure the operational performance of luxury goods 
companies, it is necessary to determine and construct a peer group in order to measure 
the performance benchmarked against the luxury goods companies’ performance. The 
usual academic approach is to use industry codes to include companies operating within 
similar industries. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, luxury products and brands can be distinguished from 
premium brands by their constitutive product and brand characteristics. The essential 
difference between these two types of brands is the fact that premium brands focus 
especially on functional characteristics while luxury brands put much more effort into 
creating a symbolic meaning. (Heine, 2012, pp. 66). However, the products offered by 
these two types of companies are functionally the same. Thus, in the light of previous 
literature, for the purposes of this thesis, an appropriate peer group for the luxury goods 
companies group should consist of premium brands. That translates into companies 
operating in the same industry as luxury goods companies but with generally lower 
pricing but to some extent these can be seen as luxury companies competitors.  
 
As mentioned in the previous section, the universe of the S&P Global Luxury Index 
constituents also includes companies that can be considered as premium goods 
companies (See Appendix 3, I and II). After the industry and geographical eliminations 
to the index, 9 premium goods companies are gathered. As the peer group sample should 
be the same size as the luxury goods companies group the additional companies are 
gathered by applying similar industry classifications.  Thus the peer group is relatively 
straightforward to construct given the focused primary sample of this thesis by applying 
similar industry classification codes for the peer group. Previous literature suggests to 
use SIC-industry codes or NACE codes for European samples, but as the sample is 
within a specific sector the same classification in terms of CGIS in the Thomson database 
but for companies that do not fill the criteria for luxury goods companies.   
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In addition, the peer group is matched in size defined by total assets as well as operating 
footprint, again excluding potential peers that do not share global market positioning. For 
further peer group matching, Barber and Lyon (1996) propose that a peer group matched 
to past-performance could yield better results for companies that have done particularly 
well (or poorly) in the past, such as luxury goods companies. However, given that this 
study expects that there should be differences in the operating performance between the 
sample and the peer group, the past-performance criteria has been relaxed for the peer 
group selection. The final composition of the 20 peer group companies is presented in 
detail in Appendix 2, I and II. Again, due to conglomeration, this sample represents 138 
premium brands.  
 
The Figure 12 illustrates the distribution of the selected sample by geography and by 
main product lines. The initial peer group is relatively precise in terms of product ranges 
but is slightly more biased towards the US by headquarters. However the location should 
not be any issue for the study as the peer group companies also generate their sales 
globally instead of just home markets. Furthermore, as both the sample and peer group 
are reporting under similar disclosure requirements due to their public company status, 
the financial reports are directly comparable which avoids several potential problems that 
peer group selection may have in regard of consolidated and unconsolidated accounts.  
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FIGURE 12 – Sample distribution by geography and main product line (Peer Group) 
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4.3  Descriptive statistics  
Table 4 below presents the luxury goods companies sample, split into geography and 
main product lines. The sample consists of 20 globally operating public luxury goods 
companies, for which the financial data is freely available. 
Fashion, Leather Goords, Apparel 4 20% 1 5% 2 10% 1 5% 0 0% 3 15% 11 55%
Watches and Jewelry 0 0% 0 0% 2 10% 0 0% 2 10% 0 0% 4 20%
Eyewear 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 2 10% 2 10%
Cosmetics 1 5% 0 0% 2 10% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 3 15%
Total 5 25% 1 5% 6 30% 1 5% 2 10% 5 25% 20 100%
The table presents the distribution of the sample companies by geographic location as well as by main product type (number as a percentage of the full sample).
TotalFrance U.K. ItalySwitzerlandGermanyU.S.
 
TABLE 4 – Geographical and product line distribution of the luxury goods companies 
 
Although the split between geographical locations is somewhat artificial due to global 
nature of the companies included in the sample, France and Italy account for half of the 
sample both with a 25 percent share. U.S. headquartered businesses are the largest single 
contributor, accounting for 30 percent while the remaining 20 percent is split between 
Switzerland and Germany, with shares of 10 percent and 15 percent respectively. 
 
In terms of main business line fashion, leather goods and accessories account for a 
majority of the companies in the sample with some 55 percent. Watches and jewelry 
account for 20 percent and eyewear and cosmetics share the final 25 percent. 
 
The initial characteristics for the sample companies are presented on Tables 5 and 6. For 
the luxury goods companies, the sales range of the sample varies from some !150 million 
to one outlier with sales closed to !20 billion with typical sample company with sales of 
!2.2 billion. Interestingly the EBITDA margins are high for the whole sample with mean 
and median EBITDA margins at over 20 percent. The most profitable company in the 
initial sample posts margins of over 40 percent.  
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# of obs Median Mean Max Min
Sales (m!) 20 2165.5 4826.3 19098.2 143.6
EBITDA (m!) 20 603.8 978.9 4090.0 14.8
Total Assets (m!) 20 2257.3 7120.5 34240.0 125.8
Net Debt (m!) 20 255.0 1411.1 8163.0 3.1
Net Debt / EBITDA 20 1.01 1.34 4.66 0.00
EBITDA / Sales 20 0.22 0.21 0.41 0.06
EBITDA / Total Assets 20 0.27 0.14 0.12 0.12
Entreprise Value (EV, m!) 20 6629.8 10263.2 43346.9 202.0
# Employees 20 8401.0 22160.6 88915.0 248.0
Sales / Employee (m!) 20 0.26 0.22 0.21 0.58
The table reports sample charasteristics as of 2007. Sales, total assets, sales / employee, enterprise value 
(EV) and net debt are reported in million Euros, profitability ratios and net debt / EBITDA in percentage 
points.
 
 TABLE 5 – Sample characteristics of the luxury goods companies 
 
In terms of leverage, the sample has a somewhat conservative balance sheet structure. 
The mean net debt to EBITDA multiple is just over 1.3x while median is slightly lower 
at 1x. This suggests that the sample should be relatively well prepared for the downturn 
when measured in financial flexibility. When measuring the company size of the sample 
the mean and median sizes are 6.6 billion Euros and 10.2 billion Euros, with largest one 
at 43.3 billion Euros and smallest at 202 million Euros. The size is measured as the 
enterprise value or equity value plus net debt. Another way to account for size would be 
to look at number of employees. In this way the differences are slightly larger with mean 
at 22 thousand employees but median only at 8.4 thousand employees. 
 
For the peer group, the sample is clearly more uneven with sales range between 70 
million Euros and 37 billion Euros with a median of 2.2 billion Euros, i.e. quite close to 
one of the luxury goods companies. In terms of EBITDA margins the peer group shows 
lower profitability with a median EBITDA margin of 15 percent and the most profitable 
one at 26 percent. Interestingly, while the peer group shows a median net debt to 
EBITDA multiple of 1.15x the sample is affected by one clear outlier with negative net 
debt to EBITDA ratio. Overall the highest multiple shows a high gearing and the sample 
is clearly less concentrated than the luxury goods companies.  
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In terms of company size, the peer group posts mean and median sized of 2.6 billion 
Euros and 8.6 billion Euros respectively, with largest company at 94 billion Euros. 
Alternatively, the size can be expressed by the number of employees showing again large 
differences with median of slightly less than 7 thousand employees and a mean of 18 
thousand employees.  
 
# of obs Median Mean Max Min
Sales (m!) 20 2240,9 5375,6 37227,0 68,8
EBITDA (m!) 20 245,7 895,5 8476,0 -26,5
Total Assets (m!) 20 1889,4 3542,4 21892,0 45,0
Net Debt (m!) 20 56,7 520,3 2912,0 0,0
Net Debt / EBITDA 20 1,15 -0,51 7,47 -33,46
EBITDA / Sales 20 0,15 0,14 0,26 -0,01
EBITDA / Total Assets 20 0,13 0,25 0,39 -0,59
Enterprise value (EV, m!) 20 2594,8 8617,8 94242,7 0,0
# Employees 19 6899,0 18521,6 141000,0 170,0
Sales / Employee (m!) 19 0,32 0,29 0,26 0,40
The table below reports sample charasteristics as of 2007 for the peer group. Sales, total assets, sales / employee, 
enterprise value (EV) and net debt are reported in million Euros, profitability ratios and net debt / EBITDA in percentage 
points.
 
TABLE 6 – Sample characteristics of the peer group 
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4.4 Discussion on measuring operating performance 
As the key attribution of this thesis is to measure the performance of the sample during 
the financial crisis, it is of importance to select carefully the performance measures and 
with regard to the research question.  
 
Firstly, as noted in Chapter 3, usually during economic downturns, the first impact is 
seen on declining turnover. Furthermore, in accordance with prior literature, operational 
measures should be scaled in order to provide with more comparability. As other 
measures can be scaled by companies’ sales, the change in sales is selected as the first 
indicator. While sales may be the first indicator of changed environment, the focus of this 
study is on the operational performance of the sample. As described earlier, many of the 
recent studies use operating income as the main proxy for operational performance 
instead of EPS or ROE. The benefits of using operating income include e.g. exclusion of 
company specific special items, and taxation and thus offer a cleaner and more 
comparable measure than ROE for example. Furthermore, as the operating income takes 
an indifferent view on how the companies are financed – by not accounting for interest 
expenses and debt repayments – it provides a more accurate picture of the real operating 
efficiency. (Barber and Lyon, 1996) 
 
For the purposes of this thesis, EBITDA is selected as the main proxy for operating 
income. It is selected as it offers a close measure to firms’ cash flows, which in essence 
are forming the value of also listed companies. In addition, traditional measures, such as 
ROA, are often criticized of being recorded at historic costs while operating income is 
measured in current Dollars/Euros. Especially during a crisis this can be seen as a real 
drawback of the measures. However, alongside with EBITDA, the operating 
performance is also measured by ROS to get a more profound picture of the profitability. 
ROS has the advantage over ROA that it can be measured constantly at any point of time, 
but compared to EBITDA it accounts for company specific items that may bias the 
results if used as a sole measure. Finally, ROA is also included in this thesis, as despite 
of its drawbacks it is often used in the previous academic literature and thus also allows 
further comparison. 
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To include financial performance during the difficult times as well, financial flexibility is 
also measured. As described in Chapter 3, during economic crises financial flexibility is 
very important feature as, by definition, it allows for greater range of options. Firstly this 
is measured, by accounting for a ratio of free cash flows scaled to EBITDA. Free cash 
flows (FCF) are defined as operating income less capital expenditure, a figure that shows 
the capability to meet financial obligations. Second measure is the debt coverage ratio or 
a common measure of indebtedness where net debt is divided by EBITDA. In other 
words this ratio implies how many years of operating income is required to repay current 
amount of external interest bearing debt. Thirdly, gearing, or net debt divided by total 
assets, is used to add depth to the analysis. The drawback of gearing is the scaling against 
assets, which gives a rather static measure, which is not the most reliable during a crisis. 
The two former measures are more current and thus can be seen as relevant figures for 
measuring financial flexibility. 
 
Many scholars have also analyzed performance by comparing the percentage changes in 
performance measures. While such approach can be preferred over measuring absolute 
changes the method has its flipsides. The first problem comes when dealing with 
negative values. In cases of negative values the approach where percentage change is 
calculated the results are not meaningful. This reduces the sample size as non-meaningful 
measures have to be disregarded for the study in order not to bias the overall results. The 
second problem is the proportional role of the pre-event levels. By this is meant that a 
similar absolute change in performance measures fairly differently in percentages 
depending on the starting levels. 
 
Finally, percentage changes in all variables are measured in this study while also testing 
for possible negative values. Given the fact that this study focuses on recessionary times, 
some values are expected to have negative changes due to expected losses in profitability 
and overall revenues. This could have a positive bias in cases where the negative values 
may be dropped from the sample. (See e.g. Barber and Lyon, 1996; Guo et al., 2011). 
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4.5 Variables 
4.5.1 Dependent variable: Abnormal performance between luxury and 
premium goods companies 
 
First, as the aim is to follow the firm level performance over the selected time period, the 
change in the measures is calculated. Furthermore, as the study utilizes two sets of data, 
the luxury and premium goods companies, the statistical tests for difference are done for 
accounting to unadjusted and peer-group adjusted changes. For profitability related ratios 
that can also have negative values percentage point changes are applied to avoid potential 
biases stemming from negative values. Thus the first unadjusted change in the measures 
is calculated as follows: 
 
(1) 
 
 
Where Pi,t  is the performance measure of the company i in period t.  
 
In order to account for the difference in performance between the luxury goods 
companies and the peer-group, the abnormal performance "P is measured as the realized 
performance for luxury companies subtracted by the performance of the peers. Thus the 
abnormal performance is calculated with the following equation: 
 
(2) !
 
 
Where the abnormal performance of the luxury goods companies !"#$%! is defined as the 
difference to the change of peer group "&#$%! median. The reasoning behind using the 
median is that individual performance measures can be outliers, which are eliminated 
when using peer group median.!
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4.5.1 Independent variables 
 
4.5.1.1 Initial profitability 
As the crisis is expected to affect the performance of all sample companies, the initial 
profitability going to the crisis is an important factor. With higher profitability a 
company has more cash flows to use as a reserve against possible bleaker years. For the 
purposes of this thesis, the profitability is measured as the EBITDA-margin, i.e. earnings 
before interests, taxes, depreciations and amortizations of intangible assets divided by 
total sales. EBITDA-margin is selected for the measure due to its nature that is 
unaffected by the financial structures or amortization policies which may differ 
significantly between the companies. Thus, the EBITDA-margin provides with a more 
comparable indicator. The initial profitability is calculated as follows: 
 
(3) !"#$#%&!!"#$%&'(%)%&* ! !"#$%&!!!!!!"#!!! !  
 
Should the crisis have an effect on the company level it should be reflected in the 
operating performance i.e. EBITDA-margin. 
 
4.5.1.2 Sales Growth 
In addition to profitability, changes in revenues are also of interest. During a crisis, 
spending is usually cut, which is first reflected in declining corporate revenues. If luxury 
goods companies are indeed immunes to a downturn as claimed in some articles, sales 
growth should show positive changes. Should the opposite hold the change would be 
noted as a negative one. The change in sales during the crisis is measured by the sales 
growth ratio as follows:   
 
(4) !!"#$%!!"#$%!! ! !"#$%!!!!!!!"#$%!!! ! !!  
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4.5.1.3 Initial debt 
Initial leverage refers to the debt position at the beginning of the studied period and is 
measured as net debt as a multiple of EBITDA, which is also often referred to as debt 
coverage ratio. As indicated in the previous chapter, lesser the debt burden going into a 
downturn, more financial flexibility is available, as the operative cash flows do not have 
to be used towards servicing debt. Thus, the initial leverage is measured as follows: 
 
(5) !"#$#%&! "#$! ! !"#! "#$!!!!!"#$%&!!!! !  
 
Regarding the measure above, particular attention is required as in cases where the 
EBITDA has a value of zero or below zero the debt coverage ratio has no meaningful 
interpretation. Indeed, where EBITDA values are zero, debt coverage is not defined and 
the ratio shows a point of discontinuity. 
 
4.5.1.4 Size 
As described in the sample description, the size range of the sample varies to some 
extent. In light of previous research, it has been argued that smaller companies may be 
more agile to react to changing operating environments where as larger companies may 
struggle to adapt to new situations. Thus for the purposes of this study, it is also of 
interest to control for the size of the companies. Size is measured as the enterprise value 
of the companies as follows: 
 
(6) !"#$! ! !"#$%&%'($!!"#$%! ! !"#$%&!!"#! ! !"#! "#$! !  !
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4.6 Statistical Methods 
Firstly, when comparing the luxury goods companies to their peer group of premium 
brands, this study follows Barber & Lyon (1996) who argue that non-parametric test 
statistics are uniformly more powerful than parametric t-tests when measuring changes in 
operating measures. Their reasoning is that t-tests assume homoscedastic and normally 
distributed error terms, which are likely to be violated when dealing with financial 
measures such as operating measures. Thus in this thesis Wilcoxon-rank-sum-test is 
applied to test the hypotheses. 
 
The calculation of the statistic, here denominated as U, is done by ranking all 
observations into one ranked series where the ranks from observations in the sample 1 
are added-up. Then the ranks for observations in the second sample can be calculated. All 
calculations are performed with a statistical program, namely R. The statistic U is 
calculated as: 
 
(7)  !! ! !! ! !!!!! ! !!! !  
 
 and !! ! !! ! !!!!! ! !!! !  
 
Where n1 and n2 are the sample sizes 1 and 2; R1 and R2 are the sum of the ranks of 
samples 1 and 2. From these the smaller of U1 and U2 is then used and the standardized 
value is computed as: 
(8) ! ! ! !!!!! !  
 
Where mu and #u are representing the mean and standard deviation of U calculated as 
follows: 
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(9) !! ! !!!!! !  
and 
!! ! !!!!!!! ! !! ! !!" !  
 
Secondly, in order to test the sample quantitatively to measure which factors affect the 
potential abnormal performance regression analysis will be used. For this purpose linear 
regression analysis provides a central quantitative research method with extensive 
existing literature. In this analysis, one takes independent variables to explain one 
depending variable of interest. For the purposes of this study, it is of interest to measure 
the factors behind expected outperformance of luxury goods companies. For this purpose 
one selects ex-ante factors such as initial profitability or debt. In other words, the 
regression analysis is used not only to explain the past but it is used also to predict the 
future. The mathematical presentation of linear regression is as follows: 
 
(10) 
 ! ! !! ! !!!! ! !!!! !!! !!!! ! !!  
 
 
In the equation above, y is the dependent variable and x1… xn are the independent 
variables, the amount of which is n. What differs the linear regression analysis from non-
linear one is the fact that there are no higher powers of the independent variables. The 
coefficients are market with $0… $n so that $0 is the constant of the equation.  Last term 
of the equation, epsilon, is the error term. 
 
With the exception of the constant the signs of the coefficients show whether the 
dependent variable increases (positive sign) or decreases (negative sign) with the 
independent variable. The values of the coefficients, including the constant, depend on 
the unit of the independent variable in question and thus cannot be compared. Finally, the 
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error term " indicates measurement error as well as the possible effect of other 
independent variables that may affect the dependent variable but that are not taken into 
account in the model. 
 
The purpose of the regression analysis is to estimate the values of the coefficients and 
their significance levels. The method used is the ordinary least square (OLS) regression 
where the sum of the squares of residuals is minimized. The sum of he squares is also 
defined as the difference between an observation and the value, which the regression 
predicts for it. The regression can be run on a statistical program, or as in this study with 
Microsoft Excel. 
 
With regards to the significance levels of the coefficients, they indicate the probability of 
rejecting the null hypothesis when in reality the null hypothesis is true. As an example, 
for instance concluding that high initial profitability is associated with higher abnormal 
performance when in fact this would not be the case. The used significance levels are 
typically 10%, 5% and 1%. 
 
Regression analysis has five important assumptions under which the coefficients given 
are the best unbiased estimators. These assumptions are also known as the Gauss-Markov 
assumptions. First assumption takes that the expected value of error terms are zero and 
thus on average the error terms should balance each other out. Second and third 
assumptions are related to the independent variables that are assumed non-random and to 
be linearly independent of each other. If not, a multicollinearity problem may occur. 
Fourth, the error terms are assumed to be homoscedastic meaning that their variance is 
constant. Finally, the error terms are assumed to be uncorrelated with each other. 
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5  EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS  
5.1 Main Results  
5.1.1 Statistical Models Used 
In order to measure differences in operating performances between luxury goods 
companies and the selected peer group a Wilcoxon rank sum test is used as follows: 
 
(11)  !"!!! ! !!!! ! ! !!!! ! !!!! ! !!!!!! ! !"!!! ! !"!!!!! ! !!!!! ! !!"!!! !  
 
Where APi,t refers to the abnormal difference between the change in EBITDA margins for 
the luxury goods companies "Pi,t and its peer group "PGi,t. For further verifying for a 
difference the same model is applied also on return on sales where APi,t refers to the 
difference in the change of ROS for both samples. 
 
Secondly, in order to study which company level factors contribute to the expected 
different performance between luxury goods companies and its peer group the following 
OLS-regression model is used: 
 
(12) 
 !"!!! ! !! ! !! ! !"#$#%&!!"#$%&'(%)%&*! ! !! ! !!"#$%! ! !! ! !"#$#%&! "#$! ! !! ! !"#$! ! !!  
 
 
The dependent variable is the abnormal performance, measured both as the change in 
EBITDA-margins and the change in ROS during the selected study period. Of the 
independent variables, Initial profitabilityi refers to the EBITDA-margin at the beginning 
of the period; #Salesi refers to the change in total revenues during the time period and 
Initial Debti refers to the initial debt coverage (net debt divided by EBITDA). The control 
variable Sizei is calculated as the enterprise value (market cap + net debt) at the beginning 
of the studied time period. 
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The results of the Wilcoxon tests are presented in the tables 7 and 8 while table 9 
presents the results of the OLS-regression. All results are further discussed in the 
following sections of this chapter.  
2007-2008 2008-2009 2009-2010 2007-2010
A) Growth
Sales Growth 2.91% -3.26%* 12.73%*** 13.68%**
B) Profitability
EBITDA-margin 0.218*** 0.189*** 0.173*** 0.194*
ROA 0.096*** 0.075** 0.062*** 0.078***
ROS 0.088*** 0.060** 0.012*** 0.053***
C) Financial flexibility
FCF / EBITDA 0.035 0.317 0.424*** 0.259**
Debt Coverage 1.005*** 1.216*** 1.251*** 1.158***
Gearing 0.176*** 0.200*** 0.197*** 0.191***
D) Size
EV -36.03%*** 24.72%* 46.69%*** 39.58%**
# Employees -33.91%*** 24.39%*** 49.26%*** 38.58%**
The table reports changes in unadjusted performance. Changes in profitablity and financial 
flexibility measures are reported in percentage points, all other are percentage changes. 
Number of observations is 20 for all ratios. Significance levels are based on two tailed 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test. *, **, and *** denote levels that are significantly different from 
zero at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
Luxury
 
TABLE 7 – Unadjusted performances of the luxury goods companies 2007-2010 
 
Table 7 reports the changes in performance measures during the period of 2007 – 2010 
before adjusting the performance to the peer group. The first column reports change from 
2007 to 2008, second column from 2008 to 2009 and the third column from 2009 to 
2010. The last column on the right hand side reports the change over the whole period 
from 2007 to 2010. 
 
  
 
 
74 
2007-2008 2008-2009 2009-2010 2007-2010
A) Growth
Sales Growth 7.50% -0.59%** 2.90%*** 12.11%*
B) Profitability
EBITDA-margin 7.14%** 9.68% 4.81%** 7.21%
ROA -0.36%*** 1.22%** 0.62%** 0.49%***
ROS 4.44%* 4.33%** -4.28%*** 1.50%***
C) Financial flexibility
FCF / EBITDA -17.74%** -11.41%* 32.09%*** 0.98%***
Debt Coverage -14.59%*** -21.60%*** 53.58%*** 5.80%***
Gearing 3.90% 9.10% 9.49%*** 7.50%***
D) Size
EV 15.59%*** 76.34%*** -23.78%*** 28.01%***
# Employees -32.36%*** 25.94%*** 53.28%*** 35.92%***
The table reports changes in adjusted operating performance. Changes in profitablity and 
financial flexibility measures are reported in percentage points and substracted by peer 
group median change, all other are percentage changes less the change in peer group 
median. Number of observations is 40 for all ratios. Significance levels are based on two 
tailed Wilcoxon signed-rank test. *, **, and *** denote levels that are significantly different 
from zero at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
Difference / Adjusted
 
TABLE 8 – Adjusted Performance of the luxury goods companies vs. the peer group 2007-2010 
 
The table 8 above adjusts the changes in performance measures by deducting the median 
change in the peer group from the gains in the luxury goods companies group. 
(1) Change in 
unadjusted EBITDA-
margin
(2) Change in 
unadjusted ROS
(3) Change in 
adjusted EBITDA-
margin
(4) Change in 
adjusted ROS        
Initial EBITDA-margin -2.012 -9.069 -1.001 -1.971
(0.001)*** (0.936) (0.055)* (0.084)*
Sales growth 0.720 56.000 5.447 13.701
(0.006)*** (0.277) (0.476) (0.030)**
Initial Debt Coverage -0.018 2.841 0.697 1.034
(0.616) (0.722) (0.563) (0.353)
Size (EV) -0.018 0.001 -0.001 -0.002
(0.540) (0.503) (0.069)* (0.707)
Constant 0.306 -1.345 4.932 -0.251
(0.042)** (0.965) (2.999) (0.931)
# of obs 20 20 20 18
R! 0.805 0.382 0.328 0.701
The table below reports the multivariate regression results for change in operational performance measures. The models (1) 
and (2) use unadjusted pct change as dependent variable while in (3) and (4) the dependent variable is adjusted against the 
peer group. Independent variables are unadjusted. P-values are in the brackets. All regressions are OLS with 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
 
TABLE 9 – Regression Results 
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Table 9 on the previous page presents the results from the OLS-regression. Of the 
independent variables initial profitability and sales growth receive statistically significant 
results but initial debt variable does not show statistically significant results. For the 
control variable, one statistically significant result is found.  
 
Finally in order to compare the hypotheses and the results, the following table presents 
the hypotheses of this study with the findings: 
 
 
Support
H1 The luxury goods companies are not immune to an economic downturn Yes
H2
The impact of recession is greater on premium goods companies than on luxury goods 
companies Yes
H3 The luxury goods companies show increased operational performance despite recession Yes
H4 If H3 holds,  sales growth contributes positively to the performance Mixed
H5 If H3 holds, financial flexibility is contributing positively to operational performance No
H6
Larger companies have more room for maneuver during the recession and are thus less 
impacted by the downturn No
Hypothesis
 
 
TABLE 10 – Comparison of the Hypotheses and Results 
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5.1.2  Results Related to Luxury Goods Companies Performance during the 
Downturn 
 
As suggested by the previous research on recessionary times firm performance, and as 
expected in the first hypothesis, luxury goods companies are also feeling the economic 
downturn. Amongst the findings of this study are the operational figures showing that on 
average luxury goods companies also face declining profits during the downturn. 
Interestingly, however, the revenues show only a slight decrease during one year of the 
crisis before rebounding very strongly. The unadjusted figures reported on the table 
above show sales growth for the luxury group of 13.68% over the studied period. The 
annual growth rates fluctuate however from modestly negative growth at the bottom of 
the economic downturn (statistically different from zero at 10% confidence level) before 
rebounding significantly after the crisis. The last double-digit sales growth figures are 
statistically significant at 1% and 5% levels respectively. 
 
Profitability, when measured with EBITDA-margin, descends by 200 basis points during 
the downturn (significant at 1% level). The drop in profitability is however again less 
dramatic than what other industries have faced and is recouped mostly by the end of 
2010. Post-crisis profitability remains still lower than going to the crisis (significant at 
5% level). Return on assets and sales decline slightly more going to the end of 2009 
(both significant at 1% level) suggesting that the companies have some operational 
leverage that adds to the downturn. Again both measures show significant increase 
coming out of the recession but as with EBITDA-margin remain lower than the 
performance before recession. 
 
As expected in hypothesis two, the impact of a recession is greater on premium brands 
than on luxury brands. As found in the results, the luxury goods companies do indeed 
outperform their premium peers in almost all measures, most notably on overall sales 
growth and EBITDA-margins. As far as the author is aware, this is the first time such 
findings are reported. While the results are in line with the existing literature on firm 
level performance during recessions, no industry specific studies have been undertaken 
regarding the luxury goods industry. 
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In terms of sales growth the luxury sector has clearly outperformed the peer group every 
year of the downturn except 2008-2009 when the peer group has been marginally ahead. 
However, over the whole studied period, luxury goods companies’ have outperformed 
the peer group by over 12% (statistically significant at 10% level). In terms of 
profitability, the results are two-folded. When looking at the two bottom-line profitability 
measures, ROA and ROS, the abnormal operating performance of the luxury goods 
companies has been limited but in terms of EBITDA-margin, luxury goods companies 
have outperformed the peer group quite clearly. These results are statistically significant 
at 5% level.  
 
While the luxury goods companies do not show consistently increased operating 
performance over the crisis, overall the operating performance for luxury goods 
companies is positive over the full cycle of the downturn. While this finding is 
statistically significant, it cannot be confirmed by all measures. In addition, although the 
unadjusted operating performance is positive by all measures, the adjusted performance 
is negative if measured by return on sales at a specific point of time in during the 
downturn. In general however the findings support the hypothesis of outperformance 
over the peer group of premium brands. 
 
Financial flexibility remains somewhat stable over the studied period regardless the 
measure applied. All measures, cash conversion (FCF/EBITDA), debt coverage and 
gearing remain rather flat suggesting that the companies had enough room and flexibility 
in the structures to cope with a crisis. Furthermore, all but three figures are also 
significant at 1% level. While EBITDA margin has decreased during the downturn, cash 
conversion rate actually increases during the crisis. This suggests that the luxury goods 
companies have managed cash flows well and indeed increased their financial flexibility. 
The same can be seen in debt coverage (Net Debt / EBITDA), which increases only 
marginally during the crisis while the underlying denominator actually decreases. This 
suggests again that efficient cash management – as net debt accounts for short-term 
assets and cash – has played a critical role during the downturn. Finally, gearing has also 
remained seemingly flat, suggesting that luxury goods companies have fared through the 
worst financially flexible. 
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Comparing the ratios measuring financial flexibility to the peer group shows somewhat 
twofold picture. During the two first years of the downturn, the peer group seems to have 
a slightly more limited negative effect on the change in free cash flows and consequently 
in debt coverage. Going towards the end of downturn, however, the luxury goods median 
beats the peer group and eventually the ratio over the whole period suggests that luxury 
goods companies have actually performed better for the whole study period. This finding 
is also statistically significant at 1% confidence level. 
 
When measuring the changes in the companies’ size it seems that the luxury goods 
companies have reacted quite rapidly to the changes in the operating environment as the 
median change in the number of employees has decreased clearly from 2007 to 2008. At 
the same time, the median enterprise value has decreased clearly in the midst of global 
equity market turmoil of 2008-2009 and a third of the median enterprise value was lost 
during the first studied year. The findings regarding changes in size are also statistically 
significant.  
 
How the luxury goods companies came out of the crisis is however very interesting. Both 
measures of firm size, number of employees and enterprise value, have increased 
significantly since 2009. What comes to enterprise value, this might be due to equity 
market overreaction and the markets correct their pricing according the fairly limited 
negative change in profitability. However, the growth in employment suggests that the 
companies reacted perhaps slightly too strongly in the beginning of the crisis and had to 
cover their payroll since. Over the period, the median enterprise values for the luxury 
goods companies outperform its peer group by closer to 30%. It has simultaneously 
created 36% more employment over their peer group during the downturn. 
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5.1.3 Results Related to the Components of the Abnormal Performance 
(Regression Results) 
5.1.3.1 Results Related to the Initial Profitability 
In order to estimate the factors that contribute to the adjusted performance of the luxury 
goods companies during the downturn, a regression analysis was run. The first 
independent variable used is the initial EBITDA-margin, or the profitability prior to the 
crisis. According to previous literature, higher margins going to the crisis should protect 
from the adverse environment due to e.g. higher cash flows. However, the regression 
results regarding the change in unadjusted EBITDA margin shows that the initial 
EBITDA-margin has actually a negative effect on the profitability during crisis. In 
addition, the result is significant at 1% level. The results are similar for changes in 
unadjusted ROS as well as adjusted EBITDA-margin and adjusted ROS. The findings are 
also significant at 10 percent level for the adjusted independent variables. 
 
The potential explication for the unexpected results could be that if the EBITDA margin 
was high prior to the crisis, there may be more to lose in margins once the economic 
uncertainty takes place. In addition, one with very comfortable margins might not 
monitor the performance as diligently as someone with limited buffer in his/hers 
margins. For all regressions, the effect of initial profitability is inverse to the expected, 
suggesting that the negative effect of higher profitability going to a crisis holds when 
extending the regression.  
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5.1.3.2 Results Related to the Sales Growth 
 
As expected both in the light of previous literature on firm performance during economic 
downturns and the hypothesis, sales growth contributes positively to operating 
performance during the crisis. Increased sales are quite directly reflected in EBITDA 
levels and in contrast declining sales usually puts pressure on profitability margins as 
well. Indeed, sales growth shows a positive effect on unadjusted EBITDA margins 
(significant at 1% level). The finding also holds for unadjusted ROS as well as for the 
adjusted variables, adjusted EBITDA and ROS.  
 
The results suggest that sales growth is positively associated with profitability also 
during recessionary times, applicable on all independent variables, is in line with existing 
literature on recessionary time firm performance and also holds for the luxury goods 
companies. The effect of sales growth is the highest on unadjusted EBITDA-margin and 
adjusted return on sales with statistical significance at 1% level and 5% level, 
respectively. This finding is not really surprising given the fact that adding one 
dollar/euro to top line revenues should in any reasonably operating company add also to 
the earnings at least to some extent. 
 
5.1.3.3  Results Related to the Initial Debt levels 
 
Where the luxury goods companies have increased their performance, financial 
flexibility has in general been contributing to the enhancement. As described in the 
literature review, financial flexibility adds to its value during difficult times when 
corporations feel the pressure on liquidity. Thus it was hypotheses that companies with 
less leverage and more financial flexibility should experience a more positive 
performance in the crisis.  
 
Interestingly, however, leverage and financial flexibility show a two-fold picture and the 
findings were not unambiguous, as three regressions did not support the hypothesis 
where less initial leverage would contribute positively to operating performance. On 
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unadjusted EBITDA-margin, initial debt coverage has a negative impact although the 
finding is not statistically significant. This is in line with previous literature, as exceed 
leverage leave limited flexibility allocating capital and liquidity within a company, as 
most cash flows will be needed for debt servicing. However, all three other regressions 
show support of positive association between initial leverage and operating performance 
during the crisis but again these results are not statistically significant. Following Ang & 
Smedema (2011) this could suggest that the firms have had the possibility and means to 
prepare to the crisis by creating a more flexible position to meet the crisis for example by 
drawing existing debt facilities to improve cash positions. 
 
5.1.3.4  Discussion on the Control Variable 
 
As part of the regression analysis, the abnormal change in operating performance 
between the luxury goods companies and their premium brand peers are controlled by 
size, i.e. the enterprise value of the companies. The existing literature suggested that 
larger companies should have more buffers when a crisis hits as they can dispose of 
assets to free cash if needed. On the other hand, previous literature also suggested that 
smaller companies might be more agile to respond to changed environment.  
 
This hypothesis assuming that larger size protects companies from downturn did not find 
support from the regression models results. On the contrary, the results suggested that 
larger companies actually fare worse than their smaller counterparts. This finding, 
although statistically significant on only one result, suggest that the smaller companies 
are indeed more flexible in adjusting to changes. The results could also be due to the 
possible slack and inefficiencies in larger companies that come to play during a crisis 
where overhead costs are rapidly reflected in the bottom-line results.  
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5.2 Reliability and Validity Analyses 
5.2.1 Reliability and Validity Discussion 
As indicated in the earlier chapters of this thesis, the aim of the study is to analyze how 
luxury goods companies perform during the economic downturn of 2007-2009 and 
whether the industry outperforms premium goods companies. Furthermore, the aim is to 
identify components of this outperformance, which should reflect the existence of such 
factors. Although several studies exist on corporate level operational performance during 
economic downturns, most of the authors have found different findings. These might be 
due to the robustness, sample selection, the selected time frame for the studies or 
geographic issues.  
 
One topic that requires attention in studies applying a regression analyses is the potential 
issue arising from multicollinearity. Another point that could have effect on the results is 
potentially influential variables that could be due to e.g. sample including outliers. 
Multicollinearity, by definition, refers to a situation where two or more of the 
independent variables are linearly correlated which could make it hard to evaluate the 
effect of each of the variables on the dependent variable. Ott & Longnecker (2004) 
propose several ways to identify multicollinearity. To start with, should one observe a 
high R2 value for the regression but only little significant t-values this could be a sign of 
multicolliearity. For the regression used in this study, this does not pose a problem with 
R2 values being moderate (ranging between 0.32 and 0.8) and there are eight significant 
t-values. Another suggestion is to measure for VIF value, or how much the variance of a 
regression coefficient is due to multicollinearity. With a value above 5 the VIF-test 
indicates of a high multicollinearity. For the results obtained, the average VIF value of 
2.2 does not suggest issues with multicollinearity.  
 
Some biases may have occurred due to the data selection. As the data is hand-constructed 
from several indices, the elimination of luxury companies on industry related factors, 
luxury goods companies that do not operate globally or the ones for which there was not 
enough publicly available data for the whole period had to be excluded. However, the 
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sample is very universal in the sense that all companies show similar features and thus 
covers the universe well. Consequently, the data should not be biased.  
5.2.2 Internal Validity 
In general, the validity of any study refers to the degree it accurately measures the 
concept that is aimed to be measured. This is extended with the concept of reliability, 
which refers to the accuracy of the instruments or procedures used. Consequently, a 
study could be reliable but invalid. For the purposes of this thesis, one should verify that 
the results actually indicate what factors affect the outperformance of luxury goods 
companies during the economic downturn of 2007-2009. This can be done by assessing 
the measurements, or variables, used in the study. 
 
The dependent variable of this thesis, the abnormal profitability of luxury goods 
companies versus the premium companies, is measured as the EBITDA-margin or return 
on sales. As discussed in Chapter 3, both of these measures have their shortcomings, 
ROS in the sense that it is a static measure that does not account for differences in 
financial structures, and EBITDA in the sense that it does not take into account the assets 
used to generate the earnings. However, by using both of the variables in the study, the 
results should be more comprehensive than by just using one. 
 
For the independent variables, the question could be whether for instance the debt levels 
used for the study are precise methods of theoretical concept. For very accurate measures 
one would need to apply accounting diligence by questioning e.g. what are all the items 
included in interest bearing debt. However, for the purposes of this study, the added 
value from such operation would not add value. Also as the figures are reported and cross 
checked from several industry sources, the independent variable can be considered fairly 
reliable.   
  
 
 
84 
5.2.3 Generalizability 
 
Generalizability, also known as external validity, indicates the extent to which the results 
of the study can be generalized. For the purposes of this thesis, this question would refer 
whether the luxury goods companies selected in the sample represent the full universe of 
global luxury goods companies. As discussed in Chapter 2, the definition of luxury is 
very wide and subjective, and the industry also covers a very large range of underlying 
industries and product ranges. Also when the results are generalized to cover all global 
luxury goods companies, it should be kept in mind that the companies may have different 
features depending on their jurisdiction or main product offering. 
 
While the sample covers well the traditional luxury goods industry, it is worth to note 
that specific luxury concepts such as investable luxury as luxury cars or experiential 
luxury such as travelling and leisure is excluded on purpose. These companies might 
have different features and behave contrarily than the ones included in the sample. In 
addition, it is important to note that many important players within the luxury industry 
remain privately held and thus this aspect limited the study sample.  
 
Another aspect of generalizability is the time dimension of the results or whether the 
results can be generalized to apply in future downturns as well as the one of 2007-2009. 
Given that the financial crisis led to an unprecedented global downturn, the time frame of 
this study may not be replicated in the future. From the companies point of view, such 
drastic changes in demand and the speed of the changes will (hopefully) not be replicated 
in the future, but at least the companies may be better prepared having undergone this 
crisis.  
 
For this thesis, given the hand-collected sample, the generalizability is relatively good as 
the sample is limited to the selected luxury goods companies showing very similar 
features.   
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6 CONCLUSIONS 
 
The luxury goods industry has undergone major changes during the past few decades. 
For once, the geographical scope of the luxury market has shifted considerably from the 
western world to increasingly global markets benefiting from the growth in the emerging 
markets. Secondly, the luxury goods consumer market has expanded to include a broader 
mass market. Consequently, goods formerly reserved to a restricted elite of wealthy 
people, are now consumed by a large public even if only occasionally. As of today, on 
average half of the luxury goods sales have been estimated to come from the mass-
market consumers. Another important development of the luxury market is the 
consolidation phase it has undergone since 1980’s. As luxury goods companies post very 
high – even luxurious- profit margins, they continue to be highly attractive acquisition 
targets and the continuous M&A activities fuel the growth of the industry. In fact, the 
market has nearly tripled in size since 1995 and is expected to post healthy growth rates 
also going forward. With all this growth, it is interesting to understand how this industry 
has evolved during the financial crisis and the following downturn.  
  
Thus, the purpose of this thesis was to analyze the operational performance of luxury 
goods companies during the financial crisis of 2008 and the subsequent recession. The 
study used a unique hand built data set with several firm characteristics. For the purposes 
of this study, the definition of the luxury goods industry was limited to the so-called 
personal luxury goods or luxury consumer goods. The sample consisted of twenty 
publicly traded global luxury goods companies and a peer group of twenty premium 
goods companies also operating globally. The timeframe selected for this study was from 
2007 to 2010, thus covering the whole global economic downturn of 2008-2009. The 
existing literature regarding both the luxury goods industry and corporate performance 
during recessionary times has been found to be surprisingly limited. In this regard, this 
study contributes by providing a combining literature review on both the industry and 
corporate performance during recessionary times, by providing evidence and insights on 
the operational performance of luxury goods companies during the recession of 2008-
2009.  
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6.1 Overview of the results 
In line with previous research on operational performance during recessions, luxury 
goods companies have been found to be feeling the economic downturn as well. 
Amongst the findings of this study are the operational figures showing that on average 
luxury goods companies also face declining profits during the downturns. However, as 
expected in the set hypothesis, the impact of the recession of 2008-2009 was found to be 
greater on premium goods companies than on luxury goods companies. As found in the 
results, the luxury goods companies indeed outperform their premium peers in almost all 
measures, most notably on overall sales growth and EBITDA-margins. As far as the 
author is aware, this is the first time such findings are reported. While the results are in 
line with the existing literature on firm performance during recession, no industry 
specific studies have been undertaken regarding the luxury goods industry. 
 
Overall the operational performance of luxury goods companies has been found to be 
positive over the full cycle of the downturn. However, while this finding is statistically 
significant, it cannot be confirmed by all measures. Indeed, although the unadjusted 
performance is positive by all measures, the peer-group adjusted performance is negative 
if measured by return on sales at a specific point of time in during the downturn. In 
general however the findings support this hypothesis.  
 
When accounting for factors affecting the performance, sales growth was also found to 
contribute positively to the operational performance during the downturn. This finding is 
in line with existing literature on corporate performance during recessionary times and 
also holds for the luxury goods companies. The effect of sales growth is the highest on 
the unadjusted EBITDA-margin and peer-group adjusted return on sales with statistical 
significance. This finding is however not really surprising given the fact that adding one 
dollar/euro to top line revenues should in any reasonably operating company add also to 
the earnings at least to some extent. 
 
In addition, where the luxury goods companies have increased their performance, 
financial flexibility has in general been contributing to the enhancement. As described in 
Chapter 3, financial flexibility adds to its value during difficult times when corporations 
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feel the pressure on liquidity. Thus the hypothesis expected that companies with less 
leverage and more financial flexibility should experience a more positive performance 
during the crisis. The findings were however not unambiguous, as three regressions did 
not support the hypothesis where lower initial levels of leverage would contribute 
positively to operational performance. On the opposite, initial net debt to EBITDA ratio 
contributed negatively only to the unadjusted EBITDA while all three other regressions 
show support of positive association of leverage and operational performance during the 
crisis. However, the findings were not statistically significant. This finding suggests that 
the use of leverage per se may not be negative if the company continues to service debt. 
For the luxury goods companies, with high operating profits this is seemingly not an 
issue.  
 
Finally the findings were also controlled by size, as the existing literature suggested that 
larger companies should have more buffers when a recession hits. This set hypothesis did 
not find support from the models applied, which on the contrary suggested that larger 
companies actually fare worse than their smaller counterparts. In fact, this finding seems 
quite interesting taken the fact that the market is highly dominated by large 
conglomerates and the fact that many luxury goods companies have grown exponentially 
by offering affordable luxury to the mass market.  
6.2 Proposals for further research 
While this thesis provides insights to the luxury goods industry and its operational 
performance during a crisis, going forward there is still plenty of room for further 
research. For once, this thesis confirms the “luxurious” margins that the industry is able 
to post despite the recession, but whether this is due to pricing, branding, global demand 
or just efficient organizations could well be subject of further research. 
 
Additionally, another interesting area for further studies would be the size factor of the 
luxury goods companies. As suggested by the results of this thesis, the smaller 
companies seem to fare better during the downturn. Whether this fact is due to 
inefficiencies within the larger companies management or other factors is less certain. 
However, this could mean to some extent that smaller niche brands may have defended 
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the economic recession by pursuing their traditional differentiation strategies and by 
relying on the very top end of the market, offering exclusive products to the wealthy who 
have not been as significantly affected by the recession as mass market consumers. On 
the other hand, larger companies may also have larger cost structures, and thus the 
smaller companies possibly could react to the crisis more rapidly than the larger 
companies. One other factor that could explain this result is the fact that the large luxury 
groups have large brand portfolios exhibiting a wide variance of results. Some of the 
brands could be performing well, while other are in pain. Thus, further research is at 
place regarding this issue. In addition, it would be interesting to study, whether the 
smaller companies could gain even more by expanding towards the mass market of 
luxury or whether that is something that affects negatively the performance.  
 
Finally, as this study described the luxury goods industry is quite various, the research 
also confirmed that there indeed exists differences between luxury goods companies and 
how economic cycles affect these. Especially, as the luxury market has grown 
exponentially through the emergence of new potential customers, there is space for 
further research regarding the impact this new demand has on the wealthy consumers 
who still account for a large part of the global luxury market sales. Whether these 
consumers have shifted their consumption towards authentic luxury brands and thus, 
whether companies who have kept their traditional differentiation strategies and have not 
embrace the potential sales volumes from the mass market are among these smaller 
companies that have outperformed larger companies is yet to be further investigated. 
Indeed, these companies could be true prestige brands that can outperform other brands 
and still continue to grow. Thus, future research could dive further into the various types 
of luxury brands and distinguish the differences in performance within the luxury goods 
companies as well as within the different luxury sub-segments. 
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8 APPENDICES 
Appendix 1, I: Luxury Goods Companies used in sample 
Company Main Business Segments Country of origin Other Brands included
1 Burberry Group Plc Clothing & accessories gb -
2 Christian Dior SA fr
3 Coach Inc Accessories & gifts us -
4 Hermès Intl Sca Clothing & leather goods fr Hermès
Accessories, Fragrances John Lobb
5 Hugo Boss AG clothing & accessories de -
6 LVMH Moet Hennessy Louis Vuitton SA Fashion & leather fr 60 luxury brands
Perfumes & cosmetics See Appendix 1, III
Wines & spirits
Watches & jewellery
Selective retailing
7 PPR SA Fashion & leather fr gucci
bottega veneta
YSL
Balenciaga
Stella McCartney
Alexander McQueen
Boucheron
8 Ralph Lauren Corp Fashion, accessories, us -
fragrances, home furnishings
9 Tod's Spa Shoers, Leather goods it Tods
Accessories Hogan 
clothing Fay
Roger Vivier
10 Baccarat Jewellery fr
Home and decoration products
11 Bulgari Spa Watches & Jewellery it Bulgari, Daniel Roth et Gérald
Genta Haute Horlogerie SA
12 Companie Financiere Richemont SA Watches & Jewellery fr Cartier
Van Cleef & Arpels
IWC
Jaeger-LeCoultre
Piaget
Vacheron Constantin
Officine Panerai
Baume&Mercier
A.Lange & Söhne
Roger Dubuis
RL Watch& Jewellery
Montblanc
Dunhill
Shanghai Tang
Chloé
Alaïa Paris
Lancel
Purdey
Net-A-Porter.com
Luxury Goods Companies
Watches & Jewellery
Fashion & leather 
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Appendix 1,II: Luxury Goods Companies used in sample 
Company Main Business Segments Country of origin Other Brands included
13 Harry Winston Diamond Corp Wathes & Jewellery us -
Diamond mining
14 The Swatch Group SA Watches & Jewellery ch Breguet
Blancpain
Glashütte Original
Jaquet Drotz
Léon Hatot
Tiffany&Co
Omega
15 Tiffany & Co. Watches & Jewellery us -
Home and decoration products
16 Luxottica Group Spa Luxury Eyewear it Luxury eyewear:
12 house brands
24 licensed brands
17 Safilo Group Spa Luxury Eyewear it Luxury eyewear:
5 house brands
26 licensed 
18 Elizabeth Arden Inc Perfumes & cosmetics us -
19 Estee lauder companies Inc Perfumes & cosmetics us Estée Lauder
Aramis
Clinique
Presciptives
Lab Series Skincare For Men
Origins
Tommy Hilfiger
MAC
Kiton
La Mer
Bobbi Brown
DonnaKaran
Aveda
Jo Malone
Bumble and Bumble
Michael Kors
Darphin
American Beauty
Flirt!
GoodSkin Labs
Grassroots Research Labs
Sean John 
Missoni
Tom Ford
Coach
Ojon
Smashbox
Ermenegildo Zegna
20 Inter Parfums Inc Perfumes us 9 licenced pretige brands:
Boucheron, Burberry
Jimmy Choo, Lanvin
Van Cleef & Arpels
7 other licenced brands
Perfumes & Cosmetics
Eyewear
Luxury Goods Companies
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Appendix 1, III: Luxury Goods Companies used in sample, LVMH Brands 
Fashion&Leather Perfumes&Cosmetics Wines & Spirits
Louis Vuitton Parfums Christian Dior Moët & Chandon
Céline Guerlain Dom Pérignon
Loewe Parfums Givenchy Veuve Clicquot
Berluti Kenzo Parfums Krug
Kenzo BeneFit Cosmetics Mercier
Givenchy Fresh Ruinart
Marc Jacobs Make up For ever Château d’Yquem
Fendi Acqua di Parma Hennessy
Emilio Pucci Perfumes Loewe The Glenmorangie Company
Thomas Pink Emilio Pucci Parfums Belvedere
Donna Karan Fendi Perfumes Domaine Chandon California Inc.
Nowness Bodegas Chandon
Watches & Jewelry Domaine Chandon Australia
Selective Retailing Tag Heuer Cloudy Bay
DFS Zenith Cape Mentelle
Miami Cruiseline Services Hublot Newton
Sephora Dior Montres Terrazas de los Andes
Le Bon Marché Rive Gauche Chaumet Cheval des Andes
Samaritaine Bulgari 10 Cane Rum
De Beers
FRED
LVMH Brands
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Appendix 2, I: Premium goods companies used in sample 
Company Main Business Segments Country of origin Brands included
1 Abercrombie & Fitch Co. Apparel, Accessories us Abercrombie & Fitch
Personal care products Hollister
Gilly Hicks
2 Ann  Inc Apparel, shoes us Ann Taylor
accessories LOFT
3 Benetton Group Spa Fashion apparel it United Colors of Benetton
Leisurewear Sisley
Playlife
4 Esprit Holdings ltd Fashion & Lifestyle products hk
5 Fossil Inc Clothing accessories us Fossil
Watches Licenced brands
Eyewear Michele
Relic
Zodiac
Adidas
burberry
Diesel
DKNY
Emporio Armani
Marc By Marc Jacobs
MICHAEL Michael Kors
6 The Gap Inc Apparel, Accessories us -
Personal care products
7 GEOX Spa Footwear & apparel it -
Accessories
8 Guess ?, Inc Apparel, Accessories us -
9 Jones Group Inc Apparel, footwear us 35 brands ex: 
jewelry, accessories Anne Klein
Jones New York
Nine West
Kurt Geiger
Jessica Simpson
10 Kenneth Cole Productions Inc Footwear & apparel us Kenneth Cole
Accessories Unlisted 
Le tigre
11 Limited Brands Inc Apparel us Victoria's Secret
Personal Care products Bath and Body Works
Pink
La Senza
Henri Bendel
12 Liz Clairborne Inc Apparel 6 Accessories us Juicy Couture
Kate Spade
Lucky Brand
MEXX
DKNY Jeans
DKNY Active
13 Nordstrom, Inc. Apparel, Accessories us
Footwear
Cosmetics
Premium Companies
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Appendix 2, II: Premium Goods Companies used in sample 
Company Main Business Segments Country of origin Brands included
14 PVH corp. apparel us Calvin Klein
accessories Van Heusen
Izod
Arrow
G.H. Bass & Co
Licenced:
MICHAEL Michael Kors
Tommy Hilfiger
Nautica
DKNY
Ted Baker
U.S. POLO ASSN
Jones New York
Timberland
Michael Kors Collection
Axcess
Clairborne
15 Ted Baker Plc Clothing & Accessories gb -
16 The Talbots, Inc Apparel, Shoes us -
Accessories
17 VF Corp Clothing, Footwear us 7 for all mankind
Accessories Ella Moss
Sportswear Lee
Rustler 
Bulwark
Majestic
Nautica
JanSport
Wrangler Europe
Eagle Creek
The North Face
SmartWool
Riders by the Makers of Lee
Reef
Kipling
Red Kap
John Varatos
Splendid
Timberland
Lucy
Napapijri
Wrangler Western Wear
Eastpak
Vans
Wrangler
18 The Warnaco Group, Inc Apparel us Calvin Klein Jeans
Accessories Calvin Klein Swimwear
Calvin Klein Underwear
Chaps, Speedo + 4 other brands
19 Wolverine World Wide Foowear us Hush Puppies
Harley-Davidson Footwear
Sebago + 9 other brands
20 Yoox Spa Apparel, Accessories it
Premium Companies
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Appendix 3, I: S&P Global Luxury Index constituents with eliminations (S&P, 2012) 
 
Luxury Goods 
Companies
Premium goods 
companies Industry related Not operating globally
1 ANN Inc.
2 Abercrombie & Fitch Company A
3 Adidas AG
4 Accordia Golf Co Ltd
5 Bang & Olufsen A/S
6 Bayer Motoren Werke AG (BMW)
7 Beneteau
8 Blue Nile Inc
9 Brown-Forman Corp B
10 Burberry Group
11 Callaway Golf Co
12 Carnival Corp
13 Chow Sang Sang Holdings International Ltd.
14 Christian Dior
15 Coach Inc
16 Daimler AG
17 Deckers Outdoor
18 Diageo Plc
19 Dufry AG
20 Elizabeth Arden Inc
21 Emperor Watch & Jewellery Ltd
22 Estee Lauder Cos.
23 Fossil Inc
24 Galaxy Entertainment Group Ltd.
25 Harley-Davidson Inc
26 Harman Intl Industries Inc
27 Hengdeli Holdings Ltd.
28 Hermes Intl
29 Hugo Boss AG Prf
30 Hyatt Hotels Corp
31 I.T Ltd.
32 Inter Parfums Inc
33 LVMH-Moet Vuitton
34 Las Vegas Sands
35 Luk Fook Holdings (International) Ltd.
36 Luxottica Group SpA
37 MGM Resorts International
38 Melco Crown Entertainment Ltd ADR
39 Millennium & Copthorne Hotels
40 Movado Group Inc
41 NIKE Inc B
42 Nordstrom Inc
S&P Global Luxury index Data 27-Jan-2012
Eliminations
 
  
 
 
104 
Appendix 3, II: S&P Global Luxury Index constituents with eliminations (S&P, 2012) 
 
Luxury Goods 
Companies
Premium goods 
companies Industry related Not operating globally
43 Orient Express Hotels 
Ltd
44 Overseas Union Enterprises
45 Oxford Industries Inc
46 PCD Stores (Group) Ltd.
47 PGM Holdings K.K
48 PPR SA
49 PVH Corp
50 Pernod-Ricard
51 Polaris Inds Inc
52 Prada SpA
53 Porsche Automobil Holding SE
54 Ports Design Ltd.
55 Ralph Lauren Corp
56 Remy Cointreau SA
57 Resorttrust
58 Richemont, Cie Financiere A Br
59 Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd
60 SJM Holdings Ltd.
61 Saks Inc
62 Shangri-La Asia Ltd.
63 Shiseido Co
64 Signet Jewelers Ltd
65 Sotheby's
66 Sparkle Roll Group Ltd.
67 Starwood Hotel & Resort World
68 Swatch Group AG-B
69 The Jones Group Inc.
70 Tiffany & Co
71 Tod's SpA
72 Toll Brothers Inc
73 Trinity Ltd.
74 True Religion Apparel Inc
75 Under Armour Inc A
76 VF Corp
77 Williams-Sonoma Inc
78 Wolverine World Wide Inc
79 Wynn Resorts Ltd
80 Yoox SpA
Eliminations
 
  
 
 
105 
Appendix 4: Interbrand ranking of the Top 100 brands/Luxury sector (Interbrand, 2012) 
 
Brand Company 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Armani Private - . 94 89 95
Burberry Burberry Group Plc 95 95 - - 100
Cartier Compagnie Financiere Richemont SA 83 83 79 77 77
Chanel Private 58 58 60 59 -
Gucci PPR/Gucci Group 46 46 45 41 44
Hermès Hermès Intl SCA 73 73 76 70 69
Louis Vuitton LVMH 17 17 16 16 16
Prada Prada Group 94 94 91 87 -
Polo Ralph Lauren Ralph Lauren Corp 99 99 - - -
Rolex Private 71 71 71 68 -
Tiffany&Co Tiffany&Co 79 79 80 76 76
RankedLuxury Brands Ranked 2006-2010
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Appendix 5: World Luxury Association (2012) ranking of the 100 most valuable luxury 
brands 
 
Top Fashion Brands Type/Owner Top Jewelry Brands Type/Owner
Burberry Burberry Group Plc Boucheron PPR
Chanel Private Bvlgari Bvlgari Spa
Christian Dior Christian Dior SA Buccellati Private
Ermenegildo Zegna Private Cartier Richemont
Fendi LVMH Chaumet LVMH
Ferragamo Salvatore Ferragamo Spa Faberge Private
Giorgio Armani Spa Private Graff Diamonds Private
Gucci PPR Harry Winston Harry Winston Diamond Corp
Hermès Hermès Intl Kloybateri Private
Louis Vuitton LVMH Mikimoto Private
Prada Prada Group Tiffany&Co Tiffany&Co
Versace Private Van Cleef & Arpels Richemont
Top Watch Brands Type/Owner Top Cosmetics Brands Type/Owner
Audemars Piguet Private Biotherm L'Oreal 
Breguet Private Chanel Private
Blancpain Swatch group Ag Christian Dior Christian Dior SA
Chopard Private Estée Lauder Estee lauder companies
Frank Muller Private Givenchy LVMH
Girard-Perregaux Sowind Group( since 2011) Guerlain LVMH
Jaeger- Le-Coultre Richemont Helena Rubinstein L'Oreal
Parmigiani Private Lancome L'Oreal
Patek Philippe Private La Mer Estee lauder companies
Piaget Richemont La Prairie Private
Rolex Private Shiseido Shiseido Co Ltd
Vacheron Constantin Richemont Sisley Private  
Top Luxury Alcohol brands Top Luxury Car Brands Top Luxury yacht brands
Dom Perignon Aston Martin Aicon
Chateau Petrus Bentley Azimut
Hennessy Bugatti Beneteau
Jean Martell Ferrari Feadship
Lafite Koenigsegg Ferretti
Macallan Whisky Lamborghini Itama
Meritage Maserati Jeanneau
Moet & Chandon Maybach-Motorenbau Gmb Pershing
Perrier Jouet Pagani Princess
Remy Martin Porsche Riva
Remy Martin Louis XIII Rolls-Royce Sunrunner
Zacapa Spyker Cars Sunseeker
Wally
Top Luxury Resorts Top Customized service Top Aviation
Amanyara Aurora Agusta Westland
Armani Hotel Dubai Blüthner BellHelicopter
Burg Al-Arb Bose Bombardier
Conral Sanya Haitang Bay Callaway Golf Cessna
Fregate Island Private Cohiba Cirrus Design Corp
Hotel Le Toiny Goldvish Dassault
Hotel Turtle Island Harley Davidson Diamond Aircraft
Le Sirenuse Lotos Embracer
North Island MontBlanc Eurocopter
Peninsula Hotel Segway PT Gulfstream
W-Hotels Steinway & Sons Hawker Beechcraft
Wakaya Club Vertu McDonnell Douglas  
